The World’s Stake in American Democracy
from Renewing America and Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy
from Renewing America and Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy

The World’s Stake in American Democracy

America's democratic difficulties will have major implications for the world.

Originally published at Project Syndicate

January 24, 2023 12:28 pm (EST)

Article
Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

For more than three-quarters of a century, the United States has played an outsized, constructive role in the world. To be sure, there have been major errors, including the Vietnam War and the 2003 Iraq War, but the US got it right far more often than not.

More From Our Experts

The results speak for themselves. US entry into World War II proved decisive. In part because of American urging, the colonial era came to a rapid if not always peaceful end. The creation of a postwar order of alliances helped to ensure the Cold War stayed cold and ended on terms consistent with Western interests and values. A range of institutions and policies provided the foundation for unprecedented global economic growth and extension of lifespans.

More on:

Democracy

United States

Renewing America

Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy

But the ability of the US to continue to play a large and influential global role is increasingly uncertain. Some reasons have nothing to do with the US but affect its position all the same.

There are new external challenges. The US economy, responsible for half the world’s output after WWII, now produces only one-fourth. Military force is now widely distributed among other countries and groups. Energy and mineral resources, along with manufacturing hubs on which the US and others depend, are widely distributed. This distribution of power and wealth gives others the ability to resist or counter US influence and might. America’s position in this world is one of overall primacy, but not domination.

America’s ability to have its way is further limited by globalization. Be it climate change or viruses, the US cannot wall itself off from the costly consequences of developments beyond its borders or generate solutions on its own. Neither isolationism nor unilateralism is a viable option.

More From Our Experts

What might be the most serious threat to global security and stability, though, stems from developments within the US, from the deep political and social divisions that threaten the country’s competitiveness, its ability to design and implement consistent policy, and even its stability.

No doubt some readers will feel more than a little schadenfreude at all this and take satisfaction from US difficulties following decades of having to follow America’s lead. But any such satisfaction will be short-lived, because in a world that is sometimes violent and always global, America’s difficulties can and will quickly become theirs. Further erosion of American democracy will be used by anti-democratic governments elsewhere to justify and extend their repression of their own populations. And, absent a strong US economy, other countries’ economies will grow more slowly as their exports lag.

More on:

Democracy

United States

Renewing America

Diamonstein-Spielvogel Project on the Future of Democracy

A weaker and less predictable US would fray the fabric of alliances, which to be effective require mutual assistance to be near-certain. Similarly, foes would grow emboldened in the belief they could act with impunity. The result would be a world of more frequent conflict, one in which advanced weapons proliferate more widely and aggressive countries wield more influence.

Moreover, a US that is distracted and divided at home would lack the capacity and the consensus to exercise leadership on global challenges such as climate change. Without American resources and leadership, the already large gap between these global challenges and global responses would almost certainly grow. There is no other country or group of countries both willing and able to take America’s place on the world stage.

The question, then, is whether the US will soon regain its footing and come to resemble the country of the past 75 years. There are some reassuring signs. American economic and military support for Ukraine has been robust. The November 2022 midterm election results were reassuring in that many of the most extreme candidates posing the greatest threat to American democracy were defeated.

But there are also less reassuring developments. We just marked the second anniversary of the January 6, 2021, assault on the US Capitol, which came close to destroying American democracy. No one can assume that such violent protests will not happen again. And now that divided government is once more a reality, it remains to be seen whether a Democratic president and Senate can find any common ground with a Republican-led House of Representatives. Early signs are not good, as the newly empowered Republicans seem more focused on investigating and obstructing than on legislating and leading.

Winston Churchill famously said, “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing – after they’ve tried everything else.” That dictum is about to be tested. The problem for the rest of the world is that it will be affected in significant ways by what happens in the US but has little or no ability to influence developments there. It is an uncomfortable but unavoidable reality.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Europe

On the eighty-first anniversary of D-Day, CFR President Michael Froman and senior fellows discuss the Trump administration’s diminished appetite for engagement in European security affairs—even as the Russia-Ukraine war drags on.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.