Queen Elizabeth II Is the Monarch of Fifteen Countries. What Does That Mean?

In Brief

Queen Elizabeth II Is the Monarch of Fifteen Countries. What Does That Mean?

Queen Elizabeth II is the monarch of fourteen countries in addition to the United Kingdom. Barbados’s transition to a republic has revived debate over the future of the Crown.

Editor’s note: We have published an updated version of this article reflecting Charles III’s reign.

More From Our Experts

Queen Elizabeth II is the longest-serving British monarch in history, having ascended to the throne in 1952 at age twenty-five. She is also the queen of more than a dozen other independent countries that were once under direct British colonial rule. In 2021, Barbados became the latest country to sever its ties with the Crown. Will others follow suit?

Where does Queen Elizabeth II reign?

More on:

United Kingdom

Political History and Theory

Congresses and Parliaments

Barbados

Jamaica

Queen Elizabeth is not only the monarch of the United Kingdom (UK), but also of fourteen other countries, including Canada and others across the Asia-Pacific and the Caribbean. These are known as the Commonwealth realms. They are distinct from the Commonwealth of Nations, a loose grouping of fifty-four countries that were once part of the British Empire but most which are not still subjects of the queen.

Together, there are some 150 million people in the Commonwealth realms, the most populous of which are the UK, Canada, Australia, Papua New Guinea, and New Zealand. 

These countries are all independent and sovereign states. Still, the role of the queen is in many places a subject of controversy, since many gained their independence through uprisings against British colonial rule.

More From Our Experts

What powers does the queen have overseas?

Commonwealth realms are constitutional monarchies, meaning the monarch’s powers are largely symbolic and political decisions are made by an elected parliament and implemented by prime ministers. The queen is thus head of state but not head of government—meaning she is not involved in day-to-day governing. (In the United States, by contrast, the president is both head of state and head of government.)

The queen does have some constitutional duties, the most significant being the approval of new governments. Depending on the country, she may formally approve legislation, appoint certain officials, or grant state honors. In non-UK realms, the queen appoints a royal representative to carry out these duties. This figure is known as a governor-general. 

More on:

United Kingdom

Political History and Theory

Congresses and Parliaments

Barbados

Jamaica

In exceptional circumstances, the Crown also has what are known as “reserve powers,” or the authority to unilaterally override other branches of government. This has happened rarely since World War II, the most notable example being Australia’s 1975 constitutional crisis, in which the governor-general dismissed a sitting prime minister.  

Most fundamentally, the purpose of the queen is to serve as a nonpartisan symbol of the nation, constitutional continuity, and moral authority—official documents are often marked with the royal seal and the queen’s visage featured on local currency. Her many trips to the Commonwealth realms have helped kindle an affection and loyalty even in countries where the republican movement is strong, such as Jamaica. The royal family has long been a source of British soft power and diplomatic influence, though that has been undermined in some realms due to accusations by Duchess of Sussex Meghan Markle of racism within the family.

Jamaican schoolchildren welcome Queen Elizabeth II during her 2002 visit to the country.
Jamaican schoolchildren welcome Queen Elizabeth II during her 2002 visit to the country. Kimberly White/Reuters

Why have some countries left?

Nearly twenty former British territories renounced their monarchies and became republics after World War II, including India, Nigeria, and Pakistan. This has generally meant replacing the queen with another head-of-state figure, often a president whose role is also largely ceremonial. For countries that saw their monarchies as unwelcome remnants of colonialism, this was the final step in distancing themselves from its last vestiges.

The 1970s saw the last major wave of departures, with Caribbean countries Dominica, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago. Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean, left in 1992. Barbados is the latest to exit, having officially left the monarchy behind by swearing in a president on November 30, 2021.

Barbadian leaders framed the move as a long-awaited culmination of independence: “The time has come to fully leave our colonial past behind,” said Governor-General Sandra Mason in announcing the exit. The date was set to coincide with the fifty-fifth anniversary of Barbados’s independence from the UK.

What could the future hold for other Commonwealth realms?

Barbados’s decision has added to recent movements in some other countries, especially in the Caribbean, to reconsider their ties to the queen. 

Part of the Black Lives Matter movement that swept the world in 2020, protests in the UK have often focused on the repercussions of slavery in Britain’s Caribbean colonies and the role it played in the empire’s wealth and global power. Some British companies involved in the slave trade have promised to make amends, but Barbados and the other members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have pressed European governments for full reparations. Jamaica, where the movement to break with the monarchy has been gaining steam, has directly petitioned Queen Elizabeth for reparations for the Crown’s role in the transatlantic slave trade. Jamaican Prime Minister Andrew Holness went a step further in March 2022, announcing that the country intends to become fully independent of the monarchy.

Analysts differ on the likelihood that other countries will reject the Crown. Kings College’s Richard Drayton, a historian, has argued that “Barbados could be a tipping point” in that regard. Yet, Aaron Kamugisha of Barbados’s University of the West Indies says the impact is likely to be limited, especially given that some countries have stricter requirements for the change.

In Canada, for instance, it would require a constitutional reform, meaning the unanimous assent of the ten provinces as well as parliament. Canadian support for republicanism remains below a majority, but it has grown sharply in the last year. And yet another factor in Canada and elsewhere is the popularity of Queen Elizabeth. Experts say that she commands a level of respect not yet earned by much of the rest of the royal family, creating unpredictability for her successor.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Trade

President Trump doubled almost all aluminum and steel import tariffs, seeking to curb China’s growing dominance in global trade. These six charts show the tariffs’ potential economic effects.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.