Does Trump’s Change to U.S.-Syria Relations Affect Refugees?

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Does Trump’s Change to U.S.-Syria Relations Affect Refugees?

Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria and meet with its new president is a major shift in U.S.-Syria relations, but it may not be an indicator that Syrian refugees should return home any time soon. 

During the first foreign trip of his second term to Saudi Arabia, President Donald Trump gave a speech in which he announced that U.S. sanctions on Syria would be lifted to give the country “a chance at greatness.” Following this announcement, Trump met with the new interim Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, after months of diplomatic efforts by Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey that were aimed at helping the regime take a step onto the world stage following years of international isolation.

Lifting sanctions and normalizing ties with Syria now raises questions about the future of displaced Syrians, as many have become refugees in Europe or surrounding Arab states. Despite Damascus’s progress, there remains potential for a continued flow of refugees from Syria to Europe and neighboring countries. For instance, the self-declared Islamic State, which remains active in parts of the country, or potential power struggles in the coming months, could make it difficult to ensure Syrians’ safety and security.

What is the state of Syrian refugees?

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The civil war that erupted in Syria more than a decade ago displaced as many as six million people. Although the brutal Bashar al-Assad dynasty has come to an end, the uncertainty Syrian refugees face has not.

Several European countries put Syrian asylum applications on hold in December 2024. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom announced that they would halt Syrian asylum applications soon after Assad fled to Moscow because his government had been overthrown. Austria’s far-right government went further, announcing plans to return refugees to Syria. And in January, a non-binding motion to tighten migration laws set forth by Germany’s conservative Christian Democratic Union and its sister party, the Christian Social Union, passed with the support of the far-right Alternative for Germany party—though a similar bill failed to garner enough support when it was put to a vote in the Bundestag. Even with the promise of U.S.-Syria normalization and the reconstruction to come, Syrians in Europe are still thinking, “What’s next?”

Three men play cards at a table with a television screen behind them. On the screen is the Syrian interim president. He is wearing a blue suit. One of the men has turned around to look at the screen.
Men play cards at a coffee shop as Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa addresses the nation in a televised speech, in Damascus, Syria, on May 14. Yamam al Shaar/Reuters

The Syrian refugee crisis in Europe is considered to be one of the largest since World War II. As of December 2023, more than 780,000 Syrians in the European Union (EU) held refugee status or subsidiary protection, while more than 300,000 obtained EU citizenship and 180,000 held long-term residency. Of the over one million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers who entered Europe, 59 percent were in Germany and 11 percent were in Sweden.

Many Syrian refugees went to Europe after initially seeking asylum in neighboring countries like Jordan and Lebanon, because of their unknown legal status in these countries, the declining labor market, and insufficient access to education. There have been periodic cuts to humanitarian programs in Jordan and Lebanon, like the World Food Program’s aid efforts there in 2015. Other funding shortages have also made Syrian refugees’ situations especially dire.

But the refugees’ lives in Europe have their own difficulties. Many who were able to integrate in the EU and gain access to the labor market and education, have still faced xenophobia in their host countries. Since their arrival, far-right European politicians have strengthened their political platforms by targeting them. For instance, studies have found that xenophobia was a predictive factor in the Brexit vote.

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How stable is Syria under the now ruling Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) government?

It is still too early to understand what Syria’s political terrain will look like after the fall of the Assads. Clashes between Assad loyalists and the new Syrian government under HTS have also threatened the country’s stability, and there has been little clarity about what is happening on the ground.

Syrian refugees have sought asylum in 130 countries around the world. In the Middle East, they fled to Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. But, even if these Syrian refugees were to return to Syria from Jordan or Lebanon—which they have already begun to do—the reality on the ground is still unknown.

That is why Europe remains attractive to those seeking a safe haven until Syria’s situation is better understood, especially given the economic malaise and the overstretched capacity of refugee intake in neighboring countries. Unfortunately, it also raises concerns about the potential for European states like Germany to now tighten migration laws. Wealthier European states, which have comparatively robust economies, are more capable of extending a helping hand to people in need of safety—but the political backlash continues to grow.

What does repatriation look like?  

Upwards of 300,000 Syrian refugees have crossed the border back into Syria as of March 2025, and over 885,000 internally displaced people have returned to their homes. However, many Syrians are unsure where to return because many of their homes have been destroyed.

Many have now seen the photo-op between al-Sharaa, Trump, and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia, and the images of the new Syrian leadership meeting with diplomatic delegations from around the world. But off-camera, back in Syria, there is a war-torn country where instability and violence remain a constant threat.

Europe’s leaders should reflect deeply on these dynamics, as far-right thinking on immigration policies in major European states could backfire. Pushing Syrians back to the Middle East, given the risks of returnees, could lead to another Syrian refugee crisis.

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