Why China Is Struggling to Deal With Russia’s War in Ukraine

In Brief

Why China Is Struggling to Deal With Russia’s War in Ukraine

China is one of Russia’s closest partners, but supporting the invasion of Ukraine would seriously damage Beijing’s ties with wealthy democracies and alienate Chinese citizens who oppose the invasion.

How has China responded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?

The invasion has put China in an awkward position. China and Russia have close economic ties, but a pillar of Chinese foreign policy is respecting countries’ territorial integrity.

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China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has released a series of stonewalling statements. It hasn’t endorsed the invasion, but also hasn’t condemned it. The ministry has repeated that the situation is complex, sanctions are useless, and the West is largely responsible for the war because it backed Russia into a corner by expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into zones formerly under Russian control. Even though China wants to position itself as essentially neutral and advocates dialogue, its positions are actually a remarkable defense of Russia and reflect strengthening China-Russia ties.

What interests is China trying to balance?

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China and Russia are each other’s closest major partner. Their economies are complementary: China is a manufacturing power but resource poor, so it needs Russian energy, while Russia has enormous energy reserves but needs investment and help broadening its economic base. Each has serious human rights and foreign policy issues but ignores the other’s troubles. China has also been a major buyer of advanced Russian weaponry.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin appear to have strong personal ties. For example, the two discussed Ukraine during a phone call on Friday, with Xi simply stating that negotiations are desirable. There was no indication that Xi criticized Putin.

Putin and Xi stand next to each other.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet in Beijing on February 4, 2022. Aleksey Druzhinin/Sputnik/Kremlin/Reuters

At the same time, China knows supporting Russia’s invasion would seriously damage its already strained relationships with the wealthy democracies that are its main trading partners, such as the United States, European Union countries, and Japan. Ties with these countries are already as bad as they have been since China began its policy of reform and opening in the 1970s. If China sided with Russia, such as by offering economic relief or agreeing to veto sanctions in the UN Security Council, then it would be hard to salvage those ties. Instead, most wealthy democracies would perceive China and Russia as being in a 1950s-style communist alliance. This would make it almost impossible for many countries to restart any form of engagement with China.

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This dilemma is reflected in how the war is discussed on Chinese social media. On the most influential platform, WeChat, a senior Chinese media editor said China should voice its “understanding and a certain amount of support” for Russia because the United States ultimately pushed it to invade, but that China shouldn’t provoke Western countries by overtly supporting Russia. On the other hand, some Chinese commentators have put the blame squarely on Putin, with one saying the war exemplified Russia’s failure to modernize. Others described what they said was heroic Ukrainian resistance, while one called the war “unjust” and condemned male Chinese commentators who made sexist remarks about Ukrainian women.

Could China’s economic relationship with Russia make sanctions ineffective?

It is unlikely that China immediately offers aid to Russia, but it could easily become the long-term buyer of gas and other resources that Russia can’t sell to Western countries. On Friday, it announced that it would loosen restrictions on Russian grain imports, but this had been in the works for some time. 

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Overall, changing the flow of resources will not happen overnight. Pipelines take many years to construct, so China can’t suddenly step in to buy sanctioned goods, such as natural gas that would have been carried by the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. But in the coming years, China can offset sanctions by becoming a no-questions-asked buyer of Russian resources.

Could Putin’s invasion embolden Xi to increase pressure on Taiwan?

China’s foreign ministry has said clearly that Ukraine and Taiwan are not the same. While China views Taiwan as an inalienable part of its territory, it considers Ukraine a fully sovereign country. But on a deeper level, the logic is similar.

Both the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation are descendants of large, continental, multiethnic empires. The twentieth century saw China lose Mongolia and Taiwan in the aftermath of the Qing dynasty’s collapse. China no longer claims Mongolia, but it still wants Taiwan and hasn’t ruled out taking it by force. Russia fared worse when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It lost most of Central Asia, as well as territories in Europe, including the Baltic states, many parts of the Caucasus, Belarus, and Ukraine. Russia seems to have given up on recapturing Central Asia (content, perhaps, to have loyal strongmen run those countries) but clearly wants segments of its European territories back.

Russia’s situation is something nationalists in China can clearly identify with. So if Russia can grab chunks of Ukraine or install a puppet regime and withstand economic sanctions, that could embolden nationalists in China to look to Taiwan and think they could do the same.

Is the United States likely to work with China in responding to the invasion?

In an ideal world, the United States would be able to restart high-level dialogue with China. It could then remind Beijing that its future is as a global leader, engaging and competing with advanced countries, not slumming with energy-state autocracies such as Russia.

But there is little hope of this happening, because ties between Washington and Beijing remain too frayed by recent developments. The current situation will likely persist, with Beijing taking potshots from the side while other countries try to save Ukraine’s autonomy.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.