Diplomacy and International Institutions

International Organizations

  • Arctic
    Changing Geopolitics in the Arctic
    Changing Geopolitics in the Arctic Prepared statement by Esther D. Brimmer James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global Governance Council on Foreign Relations   Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security United States House of Representatives 1st Session, 118th Congress   Hearing on “Strategic Competition in the Arctic”   Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and members of the subcommittee, for inviting me to testify today about “Strategic Competition in the Arctic.” The Arctic sits at the confluence of three phenomena: shifting geopolitics, changing climate, and the far-ranging implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.  The Arctic is geographical, the home of almost four million people facing the impact of climate change that will alter  lives and livelihoods.  It is also conceptual.  Just as the words “Indo-Pacific” or the “South China Sea” connote strategic concepts, so too the “Arctic” takes on renewed strategic meaning.  The Arctic is “America’s Fourth Coast” meriting increased attention to the interlocking strategic, economic, environmental, and social concerns in this region. The Arctic Circle begins at 66.5oN (north of the equator).  Eight countries have territory in the Arctic Circle: Canada, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States.  The end of the Cold War reduced political pressures in the Arctic region.  The spirit of the Norwegian concept, “High North, Low Tension” prevailed.  The strategic situation has mutated into a new configuration.  By 2023, renewed great power competition around the world is manifest in the Arctic region.  The Arctic intensifies the effects of decisions made elsewhere.  The geopolitics of the Arctic were dramatically altered by the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fundamentally transformed the security calculations of two longtime neutral countries.  As a result of Russia’s actions, Nordic states Finland and Sweden applied for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Finland had been neutral since 1948 and Sweden had been neutral since the Napoleonic era two centuries ago.  Both abandoned neutrality to seek the security of the world’s most powerful military alliance. This expansion recalibrates politics within NATO. With the accession of Finland, six (and with Sweden seven) of the Arctic countries are formal allies.  Finland was admitted in April 2023, bringing NATO an 832-mile land border with Russia.  The upshot for the Arctic is that the region transmutes from a region with five NATO allies, two strategically neutral states, and the Russian Federation to a zone with potentially seven NATO allies and the Russian Federation.  NATO is a defensive military alliance, but it is also a framework for deep cooperation among the national security communities of the member states.  Henceforth, the Arctic will play a larger role in the strategic operations, calculations, and exercises of America’s most important military alliance.  The North Atlantic and Arctic would be important for North American supplies flowing to European allies in a crisis. The institutions of the alliance will increasingly embed Arctic and High North topics into their work.  For example, Allied Command Transformation states, “…the High North is an important priority for NATO” when explaining the addition of Arctic activities to its projects preparing NATO members for future challenges.  Presidential time is valuable.  The importance of the High North was exemplified by President Joe Biden’s trip to Helsinki for the United States-Nordic Leaders’ Summit after the July 11-13, 2023, NATO summit.  Furthermore, Finland and Sweden are both members of the European Union, making two more EU members also NATO members, which could alter EU security discussions. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine not only enhanced NATO,  it also inadvertently stalled cooperation in one of the Arctic’s most distinctive multilateral organizations: the Arctic Council.  Founded in 1996 in the afterglow following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic Council embodies the spirit of cooperation; decisions are made by consensus.  The forum focuses on “sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”  By design, the Arctic Council does not address security issues.  The Council has adopted three legally-binding agreements: the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), the Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (2013), and the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017). Unusual for an intergovernmental body, the Arctic Council also includes six Permanent Participants representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples.  This special facility for interaction is distinctive and should be preserved.  Cultural ties span current national borders. Indigenous peoples have lived in the harsh climate of the Arctic for over a thousand years; their expertise and perspectives can be relevant as countries seek to understand climate change.  At the time of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia happened to hold the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council.  As part of the international response to the invasion,  the other seven members of the Arctic Council paused cooperation with Russia in that body.   Upon assuming the two-year chairmanship in May 2023, Norway sought to revitalize cooperation in the Arctic Council articulating four priorities: “the oceans; climate and environment; sustainable economic development; and people in the north.”  Another venue for cooperation, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum remains dormant with Russia holding the chairmanship through 2023. This strategic realignment in the Arctic builds on political shifts that were already evident before the invasion. Recent years witnessed a resurgence of great power competition.  The United States faces a rising power, China, and the Russian Federation. Increasingly, countries outside the Arctic have become more active in the region.  China called itself a “near-Arctic” state in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper.  In 2013, China, Japan, India, Italy, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore became Arctic Council Observers, joining France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  Many countries and companies are interested in access to resources.  The Arctic is home to living and mineral resources.  Managing access in the fragile Arctic environment is challenging.  Yet, agreements are possible.  Arctic countries share a concern about illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing that depletes delicate natural resources and vulnerable wildlife.  Canada, China, the Kingdom of Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation, the United States, and the European Union are parties to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean, which entered into force in 2021 and initially will be in force until 2037. The agreement would be automatically extended for another five years as long as none of the Parties object. In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 13 percent, or 90 billion barrels, of the world’s undiscovered conventional oil resources were in the Arctic.  Most of these resources are in Alaska and the Russian Federation.  The Arctic plays an important role in the Russian economy.  About half of the Arctic area is Russian coastline.  Twenty percent of Russia’s land mass is in the Arctic Circle and includes large cities.  Russia wants others to use (and pay to use) the Northern Sea Route. Even before the war in Ukraine, Russia needed partners for economic development.  Economic sanctions promulgated as part of the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine foreclose options for Russia.  Russia’s need for investment opens a gateway for China to be more involved in Arctic issues.  High North News notes that China has invested $90 billion in energy and resource projects in the Arctic over the past decade, largely in Russia.  China is Russia’s leading trade partner, as China is for 120 countries.  China’s investments in the Arctic are related to its Belt and Road Initiative.  Yet, patterns of Chinese shipping were different in 2022. High North News reports that whereas China’s COSCO shipping company had been the largest non-Russian operator along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), it did not send any ships along the NSR in 2022.  In 2022, of the 314 ships sailing along the Northern Sea Route, only thirty-six were non-Russian-flagged vessels.  Nevertheless, Chinese investment in Russia continues to grow.  Chinese-Russian trade rose to a “record $190 billion” in 2022.  There are European countries that still have economic links with Russia.  European Union countries’ consumption of Russian LNG increased 50 percent since sanctions started, mostly going to Belgium, France, and Spain. Increased activity by China and Russia in the Arctic is a manifestation of another trend: great power competition in global spaces.  For over a century the United States has enjoyed command of the seas and more recently airspace and outer space.  Access to sea routes, airwaves, cyberspace, and satellite information are all necessary for modern economies to function, but also require using shared international spaces that may be beyond or at the edges of national jurisdiction.  In many parts of the world great power and assertive middle powers seek access to resources, some of which may be in or under these global spaces.  Access to the global commons and areas beyond national jurisdiction is crucial for success in an era of strategic and commercial rivalry.  Therefore, protection of coastlines, waterways, safe commercial transit, and management of marine resources place extra demands on the United States Coast Guard. Oceans are especially sensitive.  At the center of the Arctic region is the Arctic Ocean, which is beyond the jurisdiction of any country.  The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea creates the international legal regime for oceans, including the Arctic Ocean.  Each Arctic country, including the U.S., claims its 200-mile exclusive economic zone.  The U.S. is at a disadvantage because it is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides mechanisms for countries to claim more rights.  Canada, Russia, and Denmark (on behalf of Greenland) turned to one of those mechanisms, the United Nations Commission on the Limit of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding their overlapping claims to the Lomonosov Ridge under the Arctic Ocean.  The CLCS made non-binding recommendations in February 2023 about the extent of Russia’s claim.  Further diplomatic or legal work will need to occur to settle the borders. The Arctic, like other regions of the world, benefits from layers of global governance.  Even in an era of geopolitical upheaval, cooperation on technical standards facilitates commercial, social, and environmental interactions.  The International Maritime Organization’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), which entered into force in 2017, provides important standards for shippers operating in the Arctic and Antarctic regions.  The terms of the Polar Code are mandatory under both the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Fundamental to understanding the geopolitical and economic issues in the Arctic is the phenomenon of climate change.  Global warming is occurring in the Arctic possibly three times as fast as in the rest of the world.  Sea ice is frozen seawater.  With less Arctic sea ice to reflect sunshine away from the Earth, the planet will continue to heat up.  Furthermore, the Greenland ice sheet (which is frozen freshwater) has lost ice for the past twenty-five years.  The ongoing geopolitical shifts occurring before the invasion of Ukraine were premised on climate change.  Climate change is important to the geopolitics of the Arctic because it changes access to the oceans.  The warming climate means that more areas of the Arctic are ice-free in the summer, possibly opening opportunities for navigation.  There could be ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean in the 2030s. Companies and countries watch to see if navigation through the Arctic would be viable, thereby shortening shipping routes and times between Asia and Europe.  Other observers counter that even with less ice, Arctic navigation would still be difficult. Climate change challenges livelihoods.  Around 4 million people live in the Arctic, and about 2 million of them are Russian; about 500,000 are Indigenous people.   Around sixty percent of Alaska Native communities are “environmentally threatened” by climate change.  Conditions are especially acute for Indigenous people who still hunt for sustenance.  Thin ice and altered animal migrations mean hunters must travel farther for food. Migration patterns of birds and fish, and also caribou, walruses, and whales have shifted, requiring people to extend the hunting season.  Warmer waters may entice fish usually found in lower latitudes to move farther north.  The changing climate also affects companies’ calculations.  Shell ended offshore exploration in Alaska in 2015. The Biden Administration’s October 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region includes investments in the Arctic.  To advance maritime security in an era of strategic competition in the Arctic, the United States must continue to deepen its commitment to Make progress on building a deep-water port in Nome, Alaska. Continue the Polar Security Cutter program. Work with the current chair of the Arctic Council, Norway, to sustain mechanisms that promote human and environmental well-being, including connections among Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic region.
  • International Organizations
    A Troubled Cup for the Beautiful Game
    Podcast
    The 2022 FIFA World Cup has kicked off in Qatar, and billions of fans worldwide are tuning in to the world’s most popular live event. And yet as in years past, the Qatar Cup is transpiring under the shadow of controversy.
  • Americas
    The Organization of American States
    The Organization of American States is an important forum for regional diplomacy and has become more assertive in promoting the rule of law, human rights, and fair elections as some states face domestic upheaval.
  • World Trade Organization (WTO)
    What’s Next for the WTO?
    In the wake of President Trump’s combative approach to trade, and with major negotiations stalled, the future of global trade rules is in doubt.  
  • World Health Organization (WHO)
    What Does the World Health Organization Do?
    Since its postwar founding, the UN agency has garnered both praise and criticism for its response to international public health crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • Southeast Asia
    What to Watch for at the Upcoming U.S.-ASEAN Summit
    The U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit will likely revolve around several key themes.
  • France
    China-Solomon Islands Pact, French Presidential Runoff, and More
    Podcast
    U.S. officials visit the Solomon Islands to discuss China, voters in France head to the polls for a presidential runoff, and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson travels to India.
  • Global Governance
    Young Professionals Briefing Series: Securing Europe—NATO Then and Now
    Play
    Our panelists discuss the history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), its expansion from twelve to thirty countries, its evolving mission in the post-Cold War world, as well as the alliance’s role and influence in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The CFR Young Professionals Briefing Series provides an opportunity for those early in their careers to engage with CFR. The briefings feature remarks by experts on critical global issues and lessons learned in their careers. These events are intended for individuals who have completed their undergraduate studies and have not yet reached the age of thirty to be eligible for CFR term membership.
  • Sub-Saharan Africa
    Ukraine Crisis Should Hasten Efforts to Rethink Policy Toward Africa
    Citizens of African states are natural partners in the fight to support a rules-based international order that curbs authoritarian regimes' excesses.
  • Southeast Asia
    ASEAN’s Year of Misery
    ASEAN is set for a frustrating year.
  • International Law
    A Negotiator's Reliance on the Nuremberg Legacy
    This year we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the verdict of the Nuremberg Tribunal: on 30 September and 1 October 1946, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) delivered its Judgement in the trial against the most high-ranking political and military leaders of the German Nazi regime. On this occasion, the Leuven Transitional Justice Blog commissioned a special series to examine the lasting legacy of the Nuremberg Trials. In this seventh instalment, David J. Scheffer looks back on the influence of the Nuremberg precedent on the subsequent drafting processes of the statutes of international courts. The influence of the London Charter and Nuremberg principles on international criminal tribunal-building since 1993 has been profound and lasting. As I wrote in my memoir, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals: “The charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo international military tribunals were the templates for the drafting endeavours of the modern tribunals. They confirmed the core definitions of crimes against humanity and war crimes and set the stage for the Geneva Conventions in 1949. The military tribunals deprived leaders of any immunity from prosecution and soldiers of the defence of superior orders. Their charters insisted on due process protections for the defendants, regardless of how repulsive or guilty they appeared.” As a statute-drafter and negotiator on behalf of the United States Government during the 1990’s in the creation of five tribunals (the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court (ICC)), I relied upon the London Charter and Nuremberg principles as the opening template for fundamental principles of law and due process. The endeavour, of course, evolved with successive tribunal statutes that were negotiated and drafted, as each one built upon the experience of immediately preceding statutes.  But the London Charter and Nuremberg principles stood guard, essentially, as the gold standard that I relied upon as a reminder of the origins of international criminal law that must be engraved for the ages. During the initial weeks of the Clinton Administration in early 1993, I happened to be reading The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, by Telford Taylor, a senior U.S. prosecutor at Nuremberg. The book had just been published and I devoured it as I began my work as Senior Adviser and Counsel to the new U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Madeleine Albright. We were thrust immediately into dealing with the atrocities of the Balkans War, which I have written about in The Sit Room: In the Theater of War and Peace.  Ambassador Albright led in the U.N. Security Council to create an international criminal tribunal quickly to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) in the Balkans to justice. The precedents of the London Charter and Nuremberg principles loomed foremost in our minds as we sought, and obtained, Security Council approval and then as the statute of the ICTY was negotiated and drafted. Indeed, on 22 February 1993, which was the day Resolution 808 authorising the establishment of the ICTY was approved, Ambassador Albright told her Security Council colleagues: “There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg principles have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-neglected compact made by the community of civilised nations 48 years ago in San Francisco to create the United Nations and enforce the Nuremberg principles. The lesson that we are all accountable to international law may have finally taken hold in our collective memory. The debates over the state of international law that so encumbered the Nuremberg Trials will not burden this tribunal.”  I drafted those words for her with Taylor’s book on my desk, reminding me of the powerful precedent of almost a half century earlier and upon which the ICTY would be built. On 13 May 1993, Ambassador Albright convened a working session at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York of academic and practitioner experts to review various draft statutes of the ICTY, as a final draft would soon be put to a vote in the Security Council. I invited Telford Taylor, who was teaching at Columbia University, to join the session. He would be the voice of Nuremberg. Taylor stressed the criticality of the documentary record that underpinned the prosecution of the Nuremberg cases. He foresaw, correctly, a more difficult task in the Balkans, where the ICTY would need to rely much more on witness testimony. One can draw a straight line between many of the London Charter provisions and what appeared in the ICTY statute. The London Charter had become well established as the plausible template for an international criminal tribunal (despite the Nuremberg court being a military tribunal) that had avoided attracting much academic or political objections over the decades since the Nuremberg Trials. That point was critical to ICTY drafters, including the U.N. lawyers who produced the final draft. To garner a unanimous Security Council vote on 25 May 1993, for Resolution 827, the argument had to prevail that the ICTY statute essentially reflected customary international law principles emerging from the London Charter. Since the major legal debate would be about whether the Security Council had the legal authority under the U.N. Charter to create an international criminal tribunal as a subsidiary organ, we wanted any concerns about the substantive character of the ICTY statute to be minimal and successfully rebuttable. So, to ground the ICTY statute in the London Charter and the legacy of Nuremberg was essential. In the drafting of the ICTR statute, one Nuremberg issue that served as a precedent for what to avoid reared its head: collective culpability. As I wrote in All the Missing Souls: “The Rwandans also wanted to cover groups as well as individuals in the tribunal statute. This would have meant that mere membership in a Hutu group, such as the National Police, Coalition for the Defence of the Republic, Democratic Republican Movement, or murderous Interahamwe, would have subjected an individual to criminal liability. The same tactic was employed in 1945 with the London Charter, which empowered the Nuremberg Tribunal to define as criminal any group or organisation to which any defendant appearing in Nuremberg belonged. In the end, the Nuremberg Tribunal declared three of six organisations named in the indictment as criminal in character. But no one else at the table wanted to go down that path in Rwanda, as it pointed toward collective culpability—precisely what we argued must not be the future of justice in the Balkans or Rwanda. The Rwandan negotiators backed down.” During the long years of negotiations leading to the Rome Statute of the ICC, the Nuremberg precedent was a persistent touchstone of reference and reliance. As the U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues during the second term of the Clinton Administration, I led the U.S. delegation to the U.N. talks. I vividly recall the many times that the German delegation would invoke the Nuremberg precedent to emphasise the imperative of creating the ICC, particularly with respect to the crime of aggression. The Japanese delegation, on the other hand, invoked both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Tribunals’ precedents to emphasise the due process protections that all defendants before the ICC must be accorded. The early objection to and longstanding criticism of the Nuremberg Trials as “victor’s justice” reverberated throughout the years of negotiation of the Rome Statute and to the present day regarding the ICC. While the ICC is a broadly subscribed treaty-based institution of presumptively objective application to all individuals and nations falling within its jurisdiction, the fact that some major powers and populous nations remain outside of its reach for all intents and purposes points to the argument of impunity for the “victors”. The People’s Republic of China, United States, Russia, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Myanmar, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, South Sudan, Eritrea, or Ethiopia, for example, can play victor in their internal repression or foreign military adventures without necessarily attracting accountability before the ICC. Thus, the claim of “victor’s justice” has persisted, albeit differently conceived, with the precedent of Nuremberg its stepfather. Remarkably, one of the American prosecutors, Ben Ferencz, at Nuremberg survived long enough to have relentless influence on the creation and operation of the ICC and, in particular, the Rome Statute’s long journey to codify the crime of aggression. The aim to prosecute aggression dominated Justice Robert H. Jackson’s approach to the initial Nuremberg Trials and Ferencz carried forth that mandate as he lobbied for its inclusion in the Rome Statute. I first met Ferencz when the ICC negotiations commenced at the United Nations in 1995. He skilfully lobbied me in my role as the U.S. negotiator for years thereafter. The memory of Nuremberg shaped all that he said, including long into the 21st century as the definition of and procedural requirements to prosecute the crime of aggression finally were agreed to and codified at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute convened in Kampala, Uganda, in 2010. Nuremberg is a “forever legacy” that will continue to shape the growth of international criminal law. I have no doubt that a century from now judges will cite the London Charter, the Nuremberg principles, and the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg Trials as they render justice in the wake, tragically, of further atrocity crimes.
  • Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Disarmament
    Reinventing Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation as Cooperative Endeavors
    Differences between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states could seriously weaken the nuclear regime. Recasting disarmament as a common endeavor that addresses each country’s legitimate interests and priorities would improve its prospects.