London Talks on Ukraine War

London Talks on Ukraine War

The Ukrainian national flag continues to fly from British government buildings, with the London Eye wheel seen behind, as peace discussions on Ukraine and Russia are due to take place in London, Britain, April 23, 2025.
The Ukrainian national flag continues to fly from British government buildings, with the London Eye wheel seen behind, as peace discussions on Ukraine and Russia are due to take place in London, Britain, April 23, 2025. Toby Melville/Reuters

Article by CFR.org Editors

April 23, 2025 9:53 am (EST)

The Ukrainian national flag continues to fly from British government buildings, with the London Eye wheel seen behind, as peace discussions on Ukraine and Russia are due to take place in London, Britain, April 23, 2025.
The Ukrainian national flag continues to fly from British government buildings, with the London Eye wheel seen behind, as peace discussions on Ukraine and Russia are due to take place in London, Britain, April 23, 2025. Toby Melville/Reuters
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Welcome to the Daily News Brief, CFR’s flagship morning newsletter summarizing the top global news and analysis of the day. 

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Top of the Agenda

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Envoys from Washington, Kyiv, and European capitals are discussing potential terms of a Ukraine peace deal in London today. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio canceled plans to attend, casting fresh uncertainty over talks as reported disagreements loom over the U.S.-proposed terms of a deal. Envoy Keith Kellogg will represent the United States in London today. Rubio had threatened last Friday to walk away from peace efforts; in the days since, the leaders of Russia and Ukraine both said publicly they were ready for talks about ending the war.

The reported developments. 

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin is open to halting the invasion of Ukraine along its current front lines and giving up claims to the portions of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia that Russia does not control, unnamed sources told the Financial Times. Russia currently claims the entirety of those Ukrainian regions. 
  • Washington has proposed acknowledging de facto Russian control over areas of those four regions, recognizing Russian ownership of Crimea, and allowing for a European peacekeeping force in Ukraine and a non-NATO force monitoring a demilitarized zone, the Financial Times reported. The U.S. State Department declined to comment.

The latest reactions.

  • Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said yesterday that he had yet to receive a concrete proposal from U.S. President Donald Trump on ending the war, but that Ukraine would not recognize Russian control over Crimea. Ukraine has pushed for a full ceasefire first and negotiations second.
  • Even as Moscow has signaled willingness to talk, a Kremlin spokesperson yesterday downplayed hopes for a breakthrough, saying “it would be wrong to put some tight limits to it and try to set some short time frame for a settlement.”
  • U.S. Vice President JD Vance told reporters today that Washington has issued a “very explicit proposal” to Russia and Ukraine and “it’s time for them to either say yes or for the United States to walk away from this process.”

“The question now is what, if anything, the Trump administration will do about Russian intransigence. Until now, the president and his envoys have been focused solely on applying pressure to Ukraine.”

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Daily News Brief

—CFR Senior Fellow Max Boot in an Expert Brief

Across the Globe

Attack in Kashmir. Gunmen killed at least twenty-six people at a tourist site yesterday in India-administered Kashmir. It was the deadliest attack in decades in the area and prompted international condemnation. A group called The Resistance Front claimed responsibility. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi cut short a trip to Saudi Arabia to return to India, and said that those responsible would be “brought to justice.” 

A dampened IMF forecast. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) lowered its 2025 U.S. growth forecast from 2.7 percent in January to 1.8 percent following the trade escalations of recent months—though it only took into account information until April 4, before Trump hiked levies to 145 percent on most Chinese goods. The IMF downgraded its global forecast to 2.8 percent from 3.3 percent. 

Trump’s shift in economic rhetoric. Trump yesterday said that he had “no intention” of firing Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, switching course from days of warnings about a potential ouster. Separately, he also said that the level of tariffs on China will “come down substantially, but it won’t be zero.” A Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said today that “the door for talks is wide open.”

The State Department’s future. Rubio announced a plan yesterday to reorganizethe State Department that will consolidate 734 bureaus and offices down to 602, according to documents seen by the Associated Press. Among the positions set to be eliminated is the undersecretary for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. The plan did not include cuts as drastic as those envisioned in a draft document that was circulated over the weekend. 

Blow for Ivory Coast election challenger. An Ivory Coast court removedpopular opposition presidential hopeful Tidjane Thiam from the country’s electoral register, in a move Thiam called “democratic vandalism.” Being on the register is a requirement for running for office. The court argued Thiam forfeited his Ivory Coast nationality when he acquired French citizenship, which he later renounced to run for the seat. President Alassane Ouattara has ruled the country since 2010.

Delay in U.S.-Iran talks. Technical talks toward a potential U.S.-Iran nuclear deal will occur on Saturday after being originally scheduled for today, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson said, adding that host country Oman suggested the delay. The talks will now occur the same day as political negotiations. Since the last round of discussions last Saturday, Iran’s foreign minister has held meetings with UN nuclear chief Rafael Grossi and with counterparts in China.

IMF mission to Syria. The IMF appointed its first head of mission to Syria in fourteen years, interim Syrian finance minister Mohammed Yosr Bernieh said. The IMF had previously left the office vacant amid the country’s civil war. Bernieh and Syria’s central bank chief are in Washington for the IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings, the first official visit by Syria’s interim authorities to the United States since the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. 

China-Vatican ties. Beijing is willing to continue to work toward mending its relationship with the Vatican following the death of Pope Francis, a foreign ministry spokesperson said yesterday. China and the Roman Catholic Church had cut off formal relations in 1951 and Francis had worked toward improving them, reaching a 2018 deal regarding the appointment of bishops in China that was never made public. China under Xi Jinping has enacted harsh restrictions on Christian religious practices. 

What’s Next

  • Today, G20 finance ministers and central bank governors hold a meeting in Washington, DC.

  • Tomorrow, South Korea’s finance minister Choi Sang-mok meets with U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.

  • Tomorrow, Zelenskyy holds talks in South Africa with President Cyril Ramaphosa.
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