Ivory Coast

Herman J. Cohen recently wrote an article for American Foreign Policy Interests discussing Africa’s “surrogate wars.” The revolt against Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore and his departure from office under duress make this article essential reading. Cohen looks at the “insurgencies” in Liberia, Rwanda, and Cote d’Ivoire. He argues that the “insurgencies” were essentially surrogate wars waged by Compaore against Liberian President Samuel Doe using Charles Taylor as a proxy; by Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni against Rwanda using the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) to “export” his domestic ethnic conflicts; and Compaore (again) against Cote d’Ivoire. All three wars have been humanitarian disasters, setting back development for decades, if not generations. Cohen argues that Africans ignore the “surrogate nature” of some “insurgencies,” and that the United States tends to follow their lead. Because the foreign sponsors of “insurgencies” remain clandestine, the African Union can regard them as civil conflicts requiring “conflict-resolution.” Sometimes, perpetrators even receive international praise for “resolving” the very conflicts that they have caused (Compaore in Cote d’Ivoire). Cohen concludes with the observation that the African Union has never seriously considered surrogate wars, and the perpetrators have not been called to account. Good riddance to Compaore! Herman J. Cohen was one of the most distinguished Africanists in public service. He was Ambassador to Senegal, with dual accreditation to the Gambia, from 1977-1980. Among his other positions, he was Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 1989 to 1993. He was also Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, and served as senior director for Africa on the National security Council.      

The New York Times and other media are reporting a drop in Ebola infection rates and empty beds in the emergency field hospitals set up by the U.S. military in Monrovia. While there is Ebola all along the border between Liberia and Ivory Coast, Abidjan has not reported any cases. The World Health Organization has stated that Nigeria and Senegal are Ebola free. Perhaps even more important, no new Nigerian cases have been announced since the WHO’s declaration. Especially in Liberia, a public communications campaign on Ebola has taken off. But, it is too soon to break out the champagne. Dr. Bruce Aylward, MD, the WHO official in charge of the Ebola campaign, cautions that infection rates can oscillate, and that mishandled burials could “start a whole new transmission chain and the disease starts trending upward again,” according to the New York Times. He also noted that there is a case of Ebola in Mali, which up to now has been infection-free. According to Dr. Aylward, 13,703 people have been infected by Ebola, all but 27 in Liberia (where about half of the victims were found), Sierra Leone, and Guinea. The mortality rate is about 70 percent. Dr. Aylward’s caution is well placed. There is anecdotal evidence of families hiding Ebola victims from the authorities, of whom they are often deeply suspicious. The emergency field hospitals are mostly in Monrovia; Ebola established itself in rural areas first, many of which are nearly impenetrable because of the lack of roads and other infrastructure. There have been nine people in the United States diagnosed with Ebola, one has died and the others have recovered or have a good prognosis. The American experience may indicate that the horrific West African experience of Ebola is a reflection of a mostly non-existent public health system. Yet, an American hysteria about Ebola, in at least some places, seems unabated, with popular calls for draconian quarantine requirements and the severing of transportation links between the United States and West Africa.

Especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the Ebola news gets worse and worse, with victims and deaths seeming to grow exponentially. Yet the disease does not appear to have spread east along the Gulf of Guinea from Liberia. Given the general porosity of African national boundaries, why and how has the march of the disease seemingly stopped at the Liberia/Ivory Coast border? (In Nigeria, the index case arrived in Lagos directly by air from Monrovia; all of the Ebola cases in the country appear to have been related to him, and his contacts have been traced and quarantined.) Nigeria is far away from Liberia. It is about 1,250 miles by road from Monrovia to Lagos, a long way for travelers by truck, bus or on foot. By contrast, Ivory Coast shares a long border with Liberia. Further, like Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Ivory Coast is recovering from a civil war. However, Ivory Coast is more developed than the three epicenters of Ebola, even if its much vaunted infrastructure was badly damaged in the civil war that ended only in 2011, and unrest continues. Yet, Ivory Coast does not have the disease, and the country may be serving as a barrier to Ebola moving toward the east. It is true that Ivory Coast has taken seemingly draconian measures. It has closed its borders and restricted air traffic through Abidjan from Ebola-infected cities. These flight bans will soon be lifted “in solidarity with infected countries.” There is anecdotal evidence that medical personnel are knowledgeable about what to do should the disease appear, including quarantining victims and tracing their contacts and the government has already inacted several public health initiatives including a law making the consumption of rodents illegal. Maybe the explanation for Ivory Coast being spared the disease is the prophylactic measures it has taken. Yet West African national borders are notoriously porous. It is hard to imagine that foot traffic between Liberia and Ivory Coast is at a standstill. There is also the possibility that the disease has arrived in Ivory Coast, but its presence is not yet known to the authorities. Still, if the disease stays out of Ivory Coast, then the measures taken by the Abidjan government should provide a useful model for stopping the spread of the disease in the future.

The current crisis in South Sudan escalated on December 15, when President Salva Kiir accused his long-time political rival former vice president Riek Machar of attempting a coup. Since then, there has been widespread fighting between the supporters of the two, with “thousands” killed and yet more thousands displaced. Foreign governments, including the United States, are evacuating their nationals, many of whom have fled to UN encampments. The fighting is likely to impact on South Sudan’s oil production, though thus far it does not appear to have spooked the international oil markets. Mostly Christian South Sudan’s struggle for independence from al-Bashir’s repressive, Islamist government in Khartoum has long been a popular cause, especially in the developed world but also in much of sub-Saharan Africa. In the two years since South Sudan’s independence, international donors has greatly expanded their assistance levels, and there are now significant numbers of expatriates working on various aid projects. Accordingly, there has been the usual handwringing and official statements by leaders of the UN Security Council and countries that have citizens on the ground in South Sudan calling for a cessation of this round of fighting. The European Commission is sending a special envoy, Alex Rondos, to South Sudan. He is scheduled to arrive on December 26. Also scheduled to arrive the same day is Ethiopian prime minister Hailemariam Desalegn and Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta. The goal is to organize and facilitate negotiations between the two warring factions. However, Machar has said at various times that he will enter negotiations only after Salva Kiir releases the former’s supporters held captive. At other times, Machar insists on Salva Kiir’s resignation as a precondition. Getting genuine negotiations underway will likely be a challenge. In the meantime, on Christmas Eve, the UN Security Council voted to increase the number of UN peacekeepers from 7,000 to 12,500 and the international police in South Sudan from 900 to 1,300. The troops and the police, all from sub-Saharan African countries, will be pulled from UN missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, and Abeiyi, the territory disputed by Sudan and South Sudan. Commentators place the fighting in an ethnic context, conflict between the Dinka, led by Salva Kiir, and the Nuer, led by Machar. That there is now an important ethnic dimension to the killing is undeniable. However, Andreas Hirblinger and Sara de Simone, in “South Sudan: What is "Tribalism" and Why does it Matter,” places the ethnic struggle in a sophisticated context. They argue, inter alia, that “ethnicity provides a lens through which power struggles have been framed throughout most of South Sudan’s recent history.” They show how personal and factional rivalries within the presidential guard spread to the armed forces, and how the threat of ethnic conflict can further an often personal agenda. As external involvement in South Sudan intensifies, Hirblingier and Simone are essential reading. Their article appeared December 24 in African Arguments.

This is a guest post by Emily Mellgard, research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations Africa Studies program. The Australia based, Walk Free Foundation on Oct 17 published their first annual Global Slavery Index. The Index ranks 162 countries by how prevalent slavery is in each country and by absolute numbers of the population that is in slavery. They use a comprehensive definition of slavery, including: “slavery, forced labor, or human trafficking. “Slavery” refers to the condition of treating another person as if they were property–something to be bought, sold, traded, or even destroyed. “Forced labor” is a related but not identical concept, referring to work taken without consent, by threats or coercion. “Human trafficking” is another related concept, referring to the process through which people are brought, through deception, threats, or coercion, into slavery, forced labor, or other forms of severe exploitation.” This broad definition aims to encompass three widely ratified and recognized international treaties: the Slavery Convention, the Forced Labor Convention, and the Trafficking Protocol. Under this umbrella definition, Mauritania ranks highest on the prevalence of slavery in any country. Fully 25 percent of the population is deemed to be enslaved. The nine other nations with the highest prevalence are: Haiti, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Moldova, Benin, the Ivory Coast, the Gambia, and Gabon. Half of the ten countries with the highest prevalence of slavery worldwide are African. Walk Free also ranks countries by the absolute number of people in slavery. The ten countries with the most slaves are: India, China, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, Thailand, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Together these countries account for 76 percent of the 29.8 million people in slavery worldwide. Countries with the lowest prevalence of slavery are: Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Iceland. The United States ranks 134, with 57,000-63,000 enslaved people. Mauritius, with an Index rank of 143, has the least slavery in sub-Saharan Africa, Swaziland ranks 126, Angola ranks 116, South Africa ranks 115, Madagascar ranks 112, and Kenya ranks 102. The Index uses pre-existing data. Some of which were collected by individual countries and by Kevin Bales at Free the Slaves. This is the first time however, that the data were collected together into a single report to provide a global overview of modern slavery. Walk Free was founded in May 2012 by Andrew and Nicola Forrest. The aims of the foundation include: identifying countries and industries most responsible for modern slavery; identifying and implement interventions in those countries and industries that will have the greatest impact on modern slavery; and to critically assess the impact of these interventions. They believe that slavery can be, finally, eliminated with broad grassroots public support, legislative action, and socially responsible corporate policy.

This is a guest post by Eric Silla. Eric has PhD in African history from Northwestern University and is the author of "People are not the Same: Leprosy and Identity in Twentieth Century Mali" (Heinemann, 1998). The recent crises in Mali have sparked discussions that are, unfortunately, often riddled with misinformation and misrepresentation of the country’s  history and current predicament. A recent example is The New Yorker’s “Letter From Timbuktu.” As a scholar of Mali who has lived and worked there, I read it with disappointment. This article, and others like it, give readers a false understanding of the factors that led to the conflict in northern Mali. The statement that slavery has dominated Mali’s history with “lighter skinned Arab descended peoples of the north” in control of “darker skinned Arab descended peoples of the south” is entirely wrong. Modern Mali encompasses a geographic area about the size of Texas and California combined. North of Timbuktu lies the Sahara desert where nomadic Tuareg and Arab tribes have circulated for centuries. Tuaregs are not Arabs; they are linguistically and culturally related to North African Berbers. Neither they nor Arab tribes have ever controlled southern Mali, though they occasionally encroached into the border areas. Mali south of Timbuktu is more ethnically diverse; parts have been controlled by a succession of polities, none of which were Tuareg or Arab. Mali’s present borders correlate with none of those polities. At its peak in the 14th century, the tributary state commonly called the “Mali Empire” dominated an area encompassing parts of present day Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea. Its power never extended far into the desert much beyond Timbuktu. Between the 15th and 17th centuries, the Songhay Empire controlled parts of present day Mali and Niger. Its capital was Gao, situated at the northern bend of the Niger River. Between the late 17th and mid-19th centuries, a state known as the “Bambara Empire” controlled the areas around the Niger River roughly between Bamako and Mopti. In the mid-19th century, a religiously inspired figure named Umar Tall launched a jihad from present day Senegal and established a polity that, at its peak, encompassed parts of present day Guinea, Mauritania, and Senegal in addition to parts of Mali extending to Timbuktu. Another figure from southeastern Guinea, Samori Toure, led a military campaign that gained control of Mali’s southeast, in addition to northern Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Mali’s “northern problem” originated at independence in 1960 when the inhabitants of the Sahara feared subjugation under a postcolonial government that would be dominated by southerners, who far outnumbered the northerners and dominated the civil service and military. Some Tuareg claimed that France had promised them their own state, which also would have included parts of Algeria and Niger. Though there had been millennia of interaction between Saharan and sub-Saharan peoples, there was no historical or cultural basis for unity other than a few decades of shared colonial subjugation for their amalgamation into a modern nation state. Post-independence Mali has seen numerous rebellions beginning with the first in 1962-64, which was crushed. Another rebellion in 1990 was precipitated in large part by the droughts and famines of the 1970s and 1980s that had decimated Saharan livelihoods and dislocated its people. Throughout, the corrupt, southern-dominated military government in Bamako neglected northern development and concentrated international assistance in the south. Libyan leader Qaddafi was simultaneously recruiting and training Saharan Tuareg and Arab militants as part of his larger effort to foment revolution across Africa. Mali’s military government began to weaken under pro-democracy activism in the south and finally collapsed in 1991. Saharan militants took advantage of the instability to launch attacks on government installations in the north, invoking northern economic and political grievances as justification. After a succession of short-lived peace agreements with the newly elected civilian government, militants signed a more durable deal in 1995. This agreement formally lasted until 2006 but gradually became irrelevant as the political and security environment in the Sahara changed. Mali’s government lacked the capacity to provide the development and security needed for long-term stability in such a vast and desolate region. Some militants, most likely in connivance with corrupt government officials, took to smuggling, particularly in cigarettes, weapons, and illicit drugs. Remnants of Algeria’s failed jihadi movement also found refuge in the Sahara, joining in the smuggling, providing training to aspiring jihadis from the region, and earning multimillion dollar ransoms from European tourists who had disregarded travel warnings and became their hostages. Periodic militant raids against military patrols and government installations gradually escalated into a full fledged “third” rebellion that lasted from 2006 to 2009. A combination of military pressure, factional splits among militants, and diplomatic involvement of Libya and Algeria led to still another peace agreement in 2009. Like its predecessors, this agreement failed to undo the underlying sources of conflict and insecurity, and the Malian government lacked any capacity to enforce it. The escalation in fighting that began in late 2011 and precipitated the present crises resulted in large part from the collapse of Qaddafi’s regime in 2011. For three decades, Qaddafi’s patronage of militants and vast financial resources enabled him to play power broker across the Sahara. His demise created a power vacuum and unleashed weapons and militants across the region. The results are now seen not only in Mali’s instability, but Niger’s, Northern Nigeria’s, and the Central African Republic’s as well. The strains of renewed conflict also exacerbated tensions within Mali’s military and led to the coup in the capital Bamako in March 2012. The current conflict and the ones that preceded it are largely about Saharan peoples fighting each other and their governments for dominance over Saharan trade (licit and illicit) routes and the towns and communities that dot the region, not conquering “dark skinned” sub-Saharan African peoples and states. The lines of conflict have correlated with tribal affiliation and social hierarchy, not race in the American sense, and even these lines are often blurry. External actors such as Qaddafi and now Algerian and other international jihadis have also exploited these conflicts to project their own influence, but their agenda has never been racial subjugation. The reductionist interpretation, using Western notions of racial politics and slavery, misleads analysis on the situation in Mali. It dates to the 19th century when the phenomenon of Arab slave raiding was hyped to justify European colonization and rally support for Christian missionaries. However, slavery was rampant across southern Mali well into the French colonial period, and “black” Africans held slaves. In fact, the “Bambara Empire” mentioned above was built largely on a slave economy. Moreover, for Saharan peoples, the American notion of skin color is not a determinant of social status or identity. One can have “noble” status with black skin, or "inferior" social rank with light skin. Using misplaced racial divisions to explain Africa’s problems can misguide activism and policymaking. I recommend readers consult “Mali: Beyond Counterterrorism” by two thoughtful experts with extensive research experience in the region and deeper connections to its people.

On April 25, the Security Council approved a UN “peacekeeping” force of 12,600 for Mali. They asked the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative for Mali, and called on member states to provide troops, police, and the necessary equipment. It also authorized the secretary general to approve cooperation between the UN mission in Mali and the UN missions in Liberia and Ivory Coast for the temporary sharing of logistical and administrative support. The new mission will be called the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It is to begin operations on July 1, taking over from the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)—unless there is a major military operation “or a continued threat from terrorist forces on the civilian population.” The Security Council also authorized French troops to “use all necessary means to support MINUSMA if it falls under imminent threat and if so requested by the secretary general.” MINUSMA’s mandate is extensive. It is to “use all necessary force” to “stabilize the key population centres, especially in the north of Mali…to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas.” It is mandated to support the Malian government’s sovereignty throughout the country. According to Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations Herve Ladsous, MINUSMA will assist the Bamako government in re-establishing a “full constitutional order, democratic governance, and national unity.” He said this would include the projected July national elections. However, Russia has been concerned that UN peacekeepers are assuming a more aggressive role than the usual monitoring of cease-fires. According to the New York Times, Russian ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin said that placing UN forces in the midst of a civil war would have “unpredictable and unclear consequences,” especially for the safety of UN personnel. Ladsous emphasizes that MINUSMA “is not an enforcement mission. This is not an anti-terrorist operation.” But, MINUSMA’s mandate includes establishing security, which likely means anti-terrorist and statebuilding operations, including a role in national elections. At present, there is no peace to keep in northern Mali. MINUSMA’s sweeping mandate appears to go beyond the UN’s traditional peacekeeping role, though there are precedents for each piece of it. Nevertheless, Russia voted for the resolution, and there seems to be little alternative to MINUSMA and its extensive mandate if peace and security are to be restored in Mali. The French have indicated that they contemplate no permanent presence in Mali, and the regional African body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), lacks the necessary capacity. But the Russian ambassador is right: MINUSMA and its extensive mandate in a civil war environment can have “unpredictable consequences.”    

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been active in sub-Saharan Africa. Seven investigations have been launched in Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, and Mali. Four prominent Kenyan politicians are due for trial in The Hague in April 2013. One of them, Uhuru Kenyatta, is a leading candidate in the upcoming Kenya presidential elections. Should he win, the new Kenyan head of state would start his term under ICC indictment. About half of sub-Saharan Africa accepts ICC jurisdiction. The United States does not. Many Africans resent the ICC as a “foreign” entity and accuse it of bias against the continent. They express concern that all present ICC indictments involve Africans–there are none from any other part of the world, though there have been in the past. Hence African interest in enlarging the jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights so that it can try individuals for the mass crimes over which the ICC currently exercises jurisdiction. Many hope that such an African court would eventually replace the ICC. Yet, some Africans are wary about whether an African court would show the willingness of the ICC to try and convict African leaders in light of the longstanding tradition of African leaders protecting each other. Others are concerned about the costs of establishing a new tribunal, especially in face of the ICC’s own current financial difficulties. Still others are exploring the possibility of an African court that would supplement, but not replace, the ICC. But, it remains unclear whether there is sufficient support for the establishment of an African alternative. The issue will likely fester for some time to come. Of the current serving ICC judges, seven are from Western Europe, six are from Africa, five from Latin America, three from Asia, and three from Eastern Europe. The position of prosecutor is high-profile.  The current prosecutor is Fatou Bensouda of Gambia, who succeeded Luis Moreno Ocampo of Argentina last year. Bensouda’s first formal investigation was launched to look into atrocities committed in northern Mali over the past year.  

The Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has rolled out a new report by the Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, “Deepening Democracy: A Strategy for Improving the Integrity of Elections Worldwide.” Vidar Helgesen, IDEA’s Secretary General, said that the report concludes that most elections provide only a “false veneer of legitimacy” for autocratic incumbents. The report includes thoughtful recommendations by which the international community can better support elections. The Global Commission is highly distinguished. Its chair is former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. Other members include former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo and Louise Arbour, president of the International Crisis Group. The report is world-wide in scope, but it is particularly appropriate to Africa. Africa Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Aisha Abdulahi in welcoming the report said that “elections can undermine democracy, worsen divisions, trigger conflicts and fail to deliver improvements in the lives of people.” She went on to say that “our governments don’t respect the rule of law; and the judiciary is not always independent or neutral, leading to further conflict.” Elections lacking credibility have led to violence in a host of African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Nigeria. In other places–Senegal and Zambia–credible elections do advance democracy. The danger for outside observers is to see elections as always a step forward when too often they increase divisions.

This is a guest blog post by Mohamed Jallow, Program Development Specialist at IntraHealth International. He was previously a program associate at the Council on Foreign Relations. Sierra Leoneans go to the polls a little over a week after the United States this year. Unlike the United States, Sierra Leone is still experimenting with the idea of democracy and all its complexities. There remains an ever present fear of elections degenerating into chaos and violence. Election periods in Sierra Leone, as across much of sub-Saharan Africa, are a challenge to the people as well as the contestants. There is an increasingly polarized atmosphere to this year’s elections in particular–heightened by an overzealous mixture of pro and anti-government factions in the press–that increases fears of political violence. People are worried about whether Sierra Leone can weather this electoral cycle without degenerating into turmoil as some of its neighbors have done. The answer to this question hinges on two things: First, whether the ruling party can exercise enough restraint when responding to political provocations from the opposition and their various mouthpieces. Second, whether a responsible press can remain true to the tenets of fair democratic debate rather than stoking deep seated divisions that could potentially destabilize the country. So far, only the former has been true. Despite its limitations, the government of current president, Earnest Bai Koroma has shown a remarkable level of restraint, especially in dealing with the incidences of violence among its supporters and the opposition. The press on the other hand, has been engaging in political flame throwing, and even overt incitement in some cases. Sierra Leone, as with many countries in the region, has seen a proliferation of newspapers in recent decades. While this is a good measure of an open political system, with the press free and vibrant, it becomes counterproductive when it fails its duty to keep the population informed, instead engaging in political demagoguery. The situation has unsettling parallels to the post-election crisis in Côte D’Ivoire in 2010. There, many newspapers openly chose sides and increased the divisive rhetoric that contributed to the violence following those bitterly contested elections. One encouraging sign in Sierra Leone though, is that civil society groups are taking steps to mitigate potential political violence during and after the elections. The Political Party Registration Commission, together with local and international partners, has been sensitizing the public and political parties to the perils of political violence, and how to avoid it. Many Sierra Leoneans have also recognized that elections by themselves are not a panacea for addressing the myriad problems facing the country, but that extreme vigilance in the face of superficial tensions can save the country from going the way of Côte D’Ivoire and Guinea.