Securing America: Key Authorities Under the Defense Production Act
Testimony from China Strategy Initiative and Asia Program
Testimony from China Strategy Initiative and Asia Program

Securing America: Key Authorities Under the Defense Production Act

Rush Doshi’s testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs addresses the significance of the Defense Production Act and steps Congress can take to reform it. 

The Defense Production Act is essential, says CFR expert Rush Doshi

The Defense Production Act is essential, says CFR expert Rush Doshi
May 22, 2025
Testimony
Testimony by CFR fellows and experts before Congress.

Four points framed Dr. Doshi’s remarks to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

  1. First, China is an ambitious and formidable competitor unlike any the United States has faced.
  2. Second, the United States needs the Defense Production Act (DPA) to cope with China’s overlapping military and nonmilitary threats.
  3. Third, China’s system has far broader authorities than the DPA, putting us at a disadvantage.
  4. Fourth, smart reforms to the DPA can address concerns about overuse without narrowing its scope.

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China seeks to “catch up and surpass” the U.S. technologically; to make the world dependent on China’s supply chains economically; and to acquire the capability to defeat U.S. forces militarily The PRC is now 130% of U.S. GDP by purchasing power, two times the U.S. share of global manufacturing, and two times U.S. power generation.

Without DPA reauthorization, the U.S. simply cannot address China’s military and non-military threats. Beijing is undertaking the fastest military buildup in history. It now boasts two-hundred times our shipbuilding capacity, eighty percent of global drone production, and global leadership in hypersonics. The U.S. also face new non-military challenges including cyberattacks and geoeconomic warfare.

The DPA is critical to addressing these threats. DPA Title III can fund new production lines for cruise missiles and uncrewed systems, expand shipyard capacity, and reshore the batteries, motors, and rare earths China now makes. DPA Title VII can help the U.S. find PRC threat vectors in American networks and critical dependencies in our supply chains. And DPA Title I and Title III can help the U.S. reallocate goods or boost production after a debilitating cyber or supply chain attack.

China’s defense production authorities also vastly exceed America’s. The PRC requires all citizens, companies, universities, and state-owned enterprises to fully support defense mobilization. Effectively, Beijing has total power to redirect production, reassign personnel, and requisition property.

The U.S. can reform DPA without narrowing its scope. Congress could consider updating the definition of “national defense” to make DPA flexible and strategic without making it a catch-all tool. Congress should allow DPA Title III investments in allied nations supporting the U.S. defense industrial base. Next, Congress should establish multi-year DPA Title III funds and authorize and appropriate funding for key national security priorities like missile production or rare earth processing. Finally, Congress should appropriate funds and encourage agencies to reactivate the now dormant National Defense Executive Reserve, originally established under DPA Title VII, to ensure a pool of industrial experts are available in a crisis.

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China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.