Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Security
Testimony from China Strategy Initiative and Asia Program
Testimony from China Strategy Initiative and Asia Program

Countering Threats Posed by the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Security

Rush Doshi’s testimony to the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security addresses Beijing’s ambitions and how they threaten homeland security in the cyber domain and through transnational crime. 

Rush Doshi Testifies to House Homeland Security Committee

Rush Doshi Testifies to House Homeland Security Committee
March 5, 2025
Testimony
Testimony by CFR fellows and experts before Congress.

Three questions framed Dr. Doshi’s remarks to the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security.

  1. First, what are Beijing’s ambitions?
  2. Second, how does it threaten homeland security in the cyber domain? 
  3. Third, how does it threaten homeland security through transnational crime?  

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The Chinese Communist Party is a nationalist political party dedicated to the goal of national rejuvenation after what it perceives as a “century of humiliation” at the hands of imperial powers. Related to that objective, the PRC has a grand strategy to displace U.S.-led order. It seeks to “catch up and surpass” the U.S. technologically; to make the world dependent on China’s supply chains economically; and to acquire the capability to defeat U.S. forces militarily. As the world’s leading industrial power with over 30% of global manufacturing and the first U.S. competitor to surpass 70% of U.S. GDP in a century, the PRC is a formidable rival. The PRC also seeks military bases worldwide, including in the Western Hemisphere.

Beijing’s preferred global order would see it project leadership over international institutions, split, Western alliances, and advance autocratic norms. It would weaken the financial advantages that underwrite U.S. hegemony and seize the commanding heights of the “fourth industrial revolution” from artificial intelligence to quantum computing. China’s military would field a world-class force with global bases to defend China’s interests in most regions and even in new domains like space, the poles, and the deep sea. The prevalence of this vision in high-level speeches shows that China’s ambitions are not limited to Taiwan or the Indo-Pacific.

PRC cyber actors have compromised sensitive U.S. networks with four key objectives. First, the PRC seeks access to American personal data for intelligence purposes, hacking major organizations like the Office of Personnel Management, Equifax, and Marriott, compromising hundreds of millions of records. Second, the PRC seeks access to American intellectual property, infiltrating companies and stealing an estimated $1 trillion worth of IP. Third, the PRC targets U.S. government systems, recently breaching tens of thousands of emails from the State and Treasury Departments, including the accounts of high-profile officials like U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo and U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns. Fourth, and most concerning, the PRC is using cyber tools to prepare the operational environment for potential wartime scenarios.

The United States needs to shrink its attack surface while investing in offensive operations against the PRC to establish deterrence. First, Congress should prohibit software companies that sell to the U.S. government from operating in China as several of those firms have provided the PRC the source code of systems that the American government relies on. Second, Congress should prohibit cloud operators that support the U.S. government from operating in China. These companies almost certainly face conflicts given the PRC’s regulatory environment. The PRC has introduced a National Intelligence Law, Counterespionage Law, Encryption Law, Data Security Law, and updates to its definition of state secrets in recent years. This regime gives the PRC the ability to demand PRC entities and individuals comply with requests from the intelligence services, provide access to encryption keys, insert personnel on site, or outright seize equipment and data. The PRC seeks to gain leverage from these entanglements in the case of conflict with the United States. Particularly concerning is is the possibility that the PRC may be learning more about systems on which the U.S. relies while reducing its own reliance on U.S. systems. Third, to prohibit certain PRC goods that connect to networks, Congress should codify the Information Communication Technology and Services Supply Chain Executive Order and fund the office that administers it. Finally, the United States needs to go on the offensive. If the PRC has accesses on U.S. critical infrastructure, the United States reciprocally needs to maintain access on PRC critical infrastructure.

In addition to cyber intrusions, China is directly complicit in the flow of Fentanyl to the United States. The PRC gives tax rebates and grants to Chinese chemical companies for manufacturing and exporting Fentanyl precursors. The PRC not only provides state-sponsored support to these companies; the Select Committee on the CCP found that the party holds direct ownership interest in at least four companies with connections to illicit drug sales. The PRC also allows these companies to advertise their goods openly on PRC websites. Moreover, PRC underground banks help cartels launder Fentanyl profits. The PRC has taken steps to address this issue, but these actions have been inadequate. Congress needs to strengthen U.S. sanctions authorities against entities involved in the Fentanyl trade, including PRC financial institutions. Relatedly, Congress can also link progress on Fentanyl to other PRC priorities, in consultation with the administration. To combat money laundering, Congress should pass the Corporate Transparency Act so law enforcement can track the beneficial owner of PRC shell companies and crack down on money laundering. Finally, Congress should pass the HALT Fentanyl Act to place Fentanyl-related substances as a class into schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.

More on:

China

Defense and Security

Homeland Security

China Strategy Initiative

China Policy Accelerator

The PRC poses many challenges to homeland security. The issues addressed in this testimony affect the lives of tens of millions of Americans. The China challenge is abstract, so it is important we link it to the lives of everyday Americans.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.