We’ve Been Looking at Trade All Wrong

There was once a broad consensus in Washington that trade was a force for good—a way to connect, grow, and prosper. But today, trade has evolved into something much bigger than just the exchange of goods. It’s become a powerful tool to rewrite the rules of foreign policy, reshape how the United States is viewed by the rest of the world, and steer us toward an increasingly uncertain future. When did this change begin, and where did we go off course?

 

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Episode Guests
  • Gabrielle Sierra
    Director, Podcasting
  • Molly McAnany
  • Markus Zakaria
  • Edward Alden
    Senior Fellow

Show Notes

Since its founding, the United States has built relationships with other countries through trade. Historically, U.S. presidents and policymakers have seen trade as one of the few easy win-wins. It’s good for U.S. companies that invest across the world, for allies exporting to the United States, and for U.S. consumers who enjoy cheaper products. So, where did we go wrong?

 

This season, Why It Matters is taking you through the ins and outs of trade. In this episode, we’re diving into the history books to learn what can the past tell us about the future of U.S. trade policy.

 

 

From CFR

 

James McBride and Anshu Siripurapu, “What’s Next for the WTO?

 

Jonathan E. Hillman, “The Rise of Economic Security

 

Roger W. Ferguson Jr., “The Intellectual Origins of Trump’s Economic Policies

 

From Our Guest

 

Edward Alden, “The Roots of Trump’s Trade Rage,” Politico

 

Edward Alden, “Trump’s Risky New Era of Broken Trade Norms,” CFR.org

 

Read More

 

Douglas A. Irwin, “Historical Aspects of U.S. Trade Policy,” National Bureau of Economic Research’s Reporter

 

Watch and Listen

 

International Trade Explained,” CFR Education

 

Trade

Global trade tensions are boiling over and questions about the United States’ economic future are at the center of the debate. As trade experts question what comes next, it’s important to analyze how the United States got to this point. How have the current administration’s trade policies of today reshaped the global order of tomorrow?

U.S. Trade Deficit

The United States has had a trade deficit, meaning we import more than we export, for the past fifty years. But recently the trade deficit has become a front-burner issue for President Donald Trump and a core reason for his administration’s sweeping tariff policy. When do trade deficits become a problem? Is the United States already at the tipping point?

Trade

With allies and adversaries alike impacted by new economic barriers and tariffs, the global map of U.S. trade relationships hangs in question. As the U.S. rethinks its commitments with its trading partners, allies may seek deals elsewhere, even with historic rivals. Can the president single-handedly tear up a trade deal, and what happens when deals that took decades to craft are suddenly up for renegotiation?

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China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.