Why Are Haitian Migrants Gathering at the U.S. Border?

In Brief

Why Are Haitian Migrants Gathering at the U.S. Border?

The arrival of tens of thousands of Haitian migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border has generated domestic criticism from all sides that the Biden administration has poorly handled a cascading humanitarian crisis.  

What happened at the U.S.-Mexico border in September?

Over two weeks, U.S. Border Patrol agents apprehended or expelled nearly thirty thousand migrants, the majority of them Haitian nationals sheltering near Del Rio, Texas. Widely circulated images of Border Patrol agents on horseback attempting to prevent migrants from crossing the Rio Grande triggered renewed debate over President Joe Biden’s immigration policy.

More From Our Experts

By September 24, federal authorities had finished clearing an encampment that had housed up to fifteen thousand Haitian migrants. Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas reported that two thousand of those migrants had been deported to Haiti on U.S.-chartered flights and eight thousand had willingly returned to Mexico. The administration allowed twelve thousand migrants to enter the United States and have their requests for asylum or other permission to remain in the country evaluated by U.S. immigration judges. An additional five thousand migrants are being considered for the same opportunity.

More on:

Haiti

Immigration and Migration

Border and Port Security

United States

This incident is part of a sharp increase in attempted border crossings over the past year and a half. In March 2020, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, the Donald Trump administration began using Title 42, an emergency public health order allowing for the immediate expulsion of migrants. Since then, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has expelled most migrants detained at the border without considering their asylum claims, as usually required by U.S. law. The Biden administration has continued to uphold Title 42 and maintains restrictions on where and how migrants can apply for asylum. In July 2021, CBP announced that it had stopped 212,672 migrants at the border, a 21-year high.

Haitian migrants cross the Rio Grande to get to the United States.
Haitian migrants cross the Rio Grande to enter the United States. The Washington Post/Getty Images

What is driving the surge of Haitian migrants to the United States?

Haiti has recently suffered fresh experiences of both political instability and natural disasters: earlier this year, a group of mercenaries assassinated Haitian President Jovenel Moise, and an earthquake left more than two thousand people dead. But corruption, poverty, and violence have long spurred migration, and for most Haitians at the U.S.-Mexico border, their arrival is the culmination of a years-long journey.

Following a devastating earthquake in 2010, many Haitians emigrated to South America. One of their first destinations was Brazil, where preparations for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics offered promising job prospects. But the COVID-19 pandemic made employment opportunities scarcer, and countries in the region closed their borders. Chile, one of the top Latin American destinations for Haitian migrants, enacted a restrictive new immigration law. As a result, many Haitians began a perilous northward march. 

More From Our Experts

Fear of violence, particularly from organized crime, informs where they attempt to cross. Rumors spread that the area around Del Rio was a relatively safe crossing site, reportedly pushing migrants to congregate in camps in the vicinity. But this is only part of a broader migration wave. Officials in Colombia told the BBC that nineteen thousand migrants, primarily Haitians, were waiting to cross the border into Panama.

What is behind the Biden administration’s response?

The administration has been clear that its use of deportation flights is intended to deter future migrants. Officials have told reporters they believe that deportees, upon arriving in Haiti, will share their experience and convince would-be migrants to avoid the journey.

More on:

Haiti

Immigration and Migration

Border and Port Security

United States

The reliance on Title 42 to carry out expulsion flights remains controversial. It has been challenged in a lawsuit by advocacy groups, and it led Daniel Foote, the U.S. special envoy to Haiti, to resign over what he called the “inhumane and counterproductive decision” to deport the migrants. While the administration continues to defend Title 42 in court, its use has slowly declined. In January 2020, more than 80 percent of enforcement actions at the U.S.-Mexico border were Title 42 expulsions; by August 2021, less than half were. 

The administration’s public embrace of a relatively aggressive expulsion policy could be calculated to shore up perceived political weaknesses, much to the frustration of immigration advocates. In public polling, Biden has so far received low marks on his handling of immigration. With leading Republicans criticizing what they see as chaos at the border, some within the administration also argue that aggressive enforcement is necessary to gain congressional support for broader immigration reform.

What other options does the administration have?

The administration could choose to restore the previous asylum rules, or even expand opportunities for Haitian migrants to apply. This summer, the administration indicated its desire for a deeper reform of the asylum process, but without congressional support for additional resources, it has limited tools. Biden did take executive action to ensure that an estimated 155,000 Haitian migrants who have been in the United States since July 29, 2021, are eligible to receive work authorizations and protection from deportation by granting them a Temporary Protected Status designation. 

He could also use another form of relief known as Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), which similarly prevents the removal of certain migrants for a designated period of time. In 1997, amid political turmoil and the fallout from a U.S. military intervention in Haiti, President Bill Clinton used DED to grant a one-year exemption to roughly twenty thousand Haitians.

Creative Commons
Creative Commons: Some rights reserved.
Close
This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.
View License Detail
Close

Top Stories on CFR

Europe

On the eighty-first anniversary of D-Day, CFR President Michael Froman and senior fellows discuss the Trump administration’s diminished appetite for engagement in European security affairs—even as the Russia-Ukraine war drags on.

Ukraine

The Sanctioning Russia Act would impose history’s highest tariffs and tank the global economy. Congress needs a better approach, one that strengthens existing sanctions and adds new measures the current bill ignores.

China Strategy Initiative

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.