What Is the Defense Production Act?

In Brief

What Is the Defense Production Act?

Presidents Trump and Biden have turned to the Defense Production Act to address the country’s vital needs, from stimulating critical supply chains during the COVID-19 pandemic to countering growing competition with China. How does the law work?

The Defense Production Act (DPA) is a Cold War–era law that gives the president significant emergency authority to control domestic industries. Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden both invoked the DPA to encourage domestic production of critical materials, including those essential for national security and clean energy technologies. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump used the law to address shortages of medical supplies, while Biden used it to accelerate vaccine production and strengthen supply chains for essential products. In his second term, Trump has again invoked the DPA, this time to bolster U.S. production of critical minerals to counter China’s near-total control over the sector.

What are the origins of the Defense Production Act?

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Passed in September 1950 at the start of the Korean War, the DPA was modeled on the War Powers Acts of 1941 and 1942, which gave President Franklin D. Roosevelt sweeping authority [PDF] to control the domestic economy during World War II. The original DPA gave the president a broad set of powers, including the ability to set wages and prices, as well as ration consumer goods, although not all of these powers have been renewed. The law has been continually reauthorized by Congress, most recently in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. It is set to expire in September 2025 unless Congress reauthorizes it.

What does it do?

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The current version of the law still gives the executive branch substantial powers. It allows the president, largely through executive order, to direct private companies to prioritize orders from the federal government. The president is also empowered to “allocate materials, services, and facilities” for national defense purposes, and take actions to restrict hoarding of needed supplies. To bolster domestic production, the president can also offer loans or loan guarantees to companies, subject to an appropriation by Congress; make purchases or purchase commitments; and install equipment in government or private factories. Companies can also be authorized to coordinate with each other, which might otherwise violate antitrust laws.

How has it previously been used?

U.S. presidents from Harry S. Truman to Barack Obama have delegated DPA powers to various parts of the government. In a 2012 executive order, Obama assigned DPA authority to sixteen federal departments and agencies.

The Defense Department has routinely used the law since 1950 to prioritize the fulfillment of its contracts, including for the president’s plane, Air Force One, and armored vehicles. The Pentagon estimates that it uses DPA authority to place roughly three hundred thousand orders per year for a variety of military-related equipment. The Federal Emergency Management Agency also uses the law to respond to disasters, bumping its orders for items such as food and bottled water to the front of the line. The DPA was also used to supply natural gas to California during the 2000–2001 energy crisis.

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A heavy-duty scraper harvests potash near Moab, Utah.
A heavy-duty scraper harvests potash near Moab, Utah. Jon G. Fuller/VW Pics/Universal Images Group/Getty Images

How have Biden and Trump used the DPA?

Presidents Trump and Biden both invoked the DPA during the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition to ordering companies to accelerate the production of ventilators and N95 masks, Trump issued an executive order to prevent hoarding of essential supplies and directed his administration to increase the domestic production capacity of essential health products. However, some experts criticized the administration for not going far enough in using the law to secure an adequate supply of personal protective equipment, including masks. 

Biden, meanwhile, signed an executive order in 2021 directing his administration to identify shortfalls in the supply of pandemic response materials and use the DPA to address them, if necessary. The order likewise tasked the administration with ensuring adequate supplies for future pandemics, including by expanding the Strategic National Stockpile. The Biden administration also used the law to spur vaccine production by helping manufacturers secure the components to make doses. 

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However, Biden went further than Trump by invoking the DPA to boost domestic manufacturing of clean energy technologies, including solar panels and heat pumps, as well as speed up production of baby formula during a nationwide shortage. Some critics say Biden used the DPA too often and too broadly, accusing the administration of “bending the law to fit its policy goals.”

What is Trump doing in his second term?

Both Trump and Biden also previously used the DPA to boost critical mineral supplies, and Trump has doubled down on this effort during his second term. In March, Trump issued an executive order invoking the DPA to ramp up domestic mineral production and reduce U.S. dependence on foreign sources—particularly from China, which provides the United States with more than half of its critical minerals. The order also expedites permitting for mining projects on federal lands that hold critical mineral deposits and expands the definition of “minerals” to include uranium, copper, potash, and gold. 

In a reversal of several Biden-era policies, the Trump administration in March also removed solar panels, heat pumps, and other green technologies from the DPA’s purview. Experts say these moves could be a sign of how the Trump administration plans to use the DPA to pursue its broader economic and national security goals.

Ariel Sheinberg and Diana Roy contributed to this In Brief.

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.