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Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations.
What is the significance of President Trump making his first foreign trip to the Gulf states?
Trump’s choice to visit Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar is important. As with his first term, the president has chosen not to visit Canada—traditionally American presidents’ first foreign destination—or Washington’s traditional allies in Europe. It is a signal that the Trump White House regards the Gulf as a critical actor in its approach to foreign policy, with its heavy emphasis on economic statecraft.
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The large sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf are potential sources of foreign investment in the United States. Trump, who, in the past mused about compelling Middle Eastern countries to pay for the security the U.S. military provides to the region, clearly regards the American military presence in the region as a point of leverage with the wealthy states of the Gulf. This is not to suggest that the United States is not a good investment, but the exchange of security for investment is consistent with the president’s transactional impulse in foreign policy.
Oil prices are at a four-year low, but even prices in the $60 per barrel range will not delay the announcement of multiple multibillion-dollar deals with and weapons sales to each country Trump visits. Procurement of high-tech defense systems takes years, and many investment projects to be announced will also have long timelines. It is likely that some of those deals will never happen.
Is the region looking to strike deals to allay the effects of tariffs?
The Trump administration has imposed 10 percent tariffs on Gulf countries. Although oil and gas are exempt, the important petrochemicals and aluminum industries are subject to these new duties. The tariffs could also raise prices for goods that Gulf countries import. More broadly, Washington’s new tariffs and the ensuing trade war have sown concern about Washington’s stewardship of the global economy.
The interest within the region to increase investment in the United States is not specifically tied to tariffs, however. The emirs, presidents, and kings of the region—as with leaders in other regions—are seeking to ensure that they remain on the right side of an American president who places a premium on dealmaking. As a result, they will likely announce multibillion-dollar investments in the United States and commitments to buy copious amounts of American-manufactured weaponry.
With U.S.-Iran talks in gear, are there likely to be discussions about freezing Iran’s nuclear program or containing the Houthis?
This is a trip about economic statecraft, but there is no way to avoid geopolitics. The Iran nuclear talks and the conflict in the Red Sea are likely to be on the agenda.
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Unlike in 2015 when the Barack Obama administration negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the response in the Gulf to the Trump administration’s diplomacy with Iran has been muted. This is a function of the fact that the regional situation has changed greatly in the past decade.
Notably, Iran is weaker than it was in 2015 after the damage Israel has done to Tehran’s proxies and Iran itself. In addition, the Saudis and Emiratis, who were both opposed to the JCPOA, have enjoyed better relations with Iran in recent years. Still, there remain concerns on the Western side of the Gulf. Iran seems intent on rebuilding Hezbollah and meddling in Syria. The Houthis also remain a threat. That is why the Gulf states are concerned about how the funds that Iran will accrue from sanctions relief will be used.
When it comes to the Houthis, the Saudis, and Emiratis were experiencing a bit of schadenfreude. For years, they warned the United States about the threat the Houthis posed to the stability of the region, but Washington refused to act out of fear of disrupting the nuclear talks that led to the JCPOA and a general aversion to escalation. The Houthis are now a more significant threat with ballistic missiles and other Iranian-supplied weaponry. That threat, at least to Red Sea shipping, seems to have diminished with President Trump’s announcement on the eve of his trip that his Middle East envoy had struck a deal with the Houthis via Omani mediators to end U.S. military operations against the group in exchange for safe passage through the area.
It is important to note that this apparent agreement does not address Israel’s security. Since October 2023, when the Hamas terrorist attacks set off a massive Israeli reprisal in Gaza, the Houthis have been firing ballistic missiles and drones at Israel. On the same day that Trump announced the agreement with the Houthis, Israel retaliated for a Houthi missile attack that caused minor damage and several injuries at Ben Gurion International Airport. The Israeli strike rendered the Houthi-controlled airport in Sana’a inoperable.
There are groups in Yemen who enjoy the support of the Saudis or the Emiratis that could be used in a broad campaign against the Houthis, but so far, there are no indications that those groups will be part of a broader strategy to end the Houthi threat to the Red Sea and Israel.
What are the prospects for diplomacy around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including deterioration in Gaza, and opportunities for spurring the Abraham Accords?
It seems unlikely that the summit in the Gulf will provide any opportunity to advance a ceasefire in Gaza. There could be a pause in the fighting while President Trump is in the region, but Israel has recently announced the call-up of thousands of reservists for a new offensive in Gaza, the logical conclusion of which is the re-occupation of large parts of the area. Given that the Saudis are demanding a two-state solution in exchange for normalization, the U.S. president’s visit to the Gulf is not a propitious moment for talks on or talk about Saudi-Israeli normalization.
It seems clear that Trump has decided to move on from the Gaza Strip in large part because he is unlikely to have success negotiating a durable ceasefire there. As a result, he has given the Israelis a lot of leeway to pursue their goals in Gaza as the Israel Defense Forces see fit. The president recently remarked that the United States would help get food and other aid into the enclave, which Israel has blocked since early March, but this seems to be little more than an offhand response to a journalist’s question. There is no indication that Washington would get directly involved in any relief effort.
This work represents the views and opinions solely of the author. The Council on Foreign Relations is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher, and takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.