U.S. Allies Rally to Support Democracy and Come to Terms With a New U.S. Foreign Policy
from Women Around the World, Women and Foreign Policy Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program
from Women Around the World, Women and Foreign Policy Program, U.S. Foreign Policy Program, and Europe Program

U.S. Allies Rally to Support Democracy and Come to Terms With a New U.S. Foreign Policy

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas looks on as she speaks at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas looks on as she speaks at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit Ritzau Scanpix/Mads Claus Rasmussen/Reuters

Two things emerged clearly from this week’s Copenhagen Democracy Summit, the eighth annual gathering convened by Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

May 16, 2025 2:48 pm (EST)

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas looks on as she speaks at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas looks on as she speaks at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit Ritzau Scanpix/Mads Claus Rasmussen/Reuters
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Two things emerged clearly from this week’s Copenhagen Democracy Summit, the eighth annual gathering convened by former Danish Prime Minister and former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The disruptive foreign policy of U.S. President Donald Trump has jolted many countries into the stark realization that they must do more, quickly, to shoulder the burden of protecting and advancing democracy, in the face of massive, unprecedented reductions in U.S. spending assistance and defense commitments that have anchored global security since the end of World War II. Second, as their initial shock has worn off, many leaders have become increasingly vocal in rejecting the Trump administration’s apparent embrace of what Rasmussen called “might makes right” as an operating principle.

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There was universal condemnation of the idea, floated by President Trump, of formally recognizing Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian territory as part of a deal to end Russia’s aggression. “We will never recognize territorial acquisition,” Croatia’s Prime Minister Andrej Plenković said, noting that his Balkan nation had been subject to just such a playbook three decades ago, in that case by Serbia. Rasmussen minced no words in challenging Trump’s benign view of Putin, saying that the Russian leader’s objective is to roll back NATO forces from Eastern and Central Europe, as he demanded in 2021.

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Even greater outrage was voiced over Trump’s explicit and repeated suggestions that he might seize territory from some of the oldest and most loyal U.S. allies, including Denmark, the host country, which President Trump has suggested relieving of Greenland. Greenland’s former prime minister, Múte Bourup Egede, who is currently the deputy PM, flatly stated that “We are not a property,” and that the country “belongs to the Greenlandic people.” Mark Garneau, a former Canadian foreign minister from the Liberal Party, similarly rejected the idea that Canada would become the fifty-first U.S. state, as Trump has repeatedly suggested. Former UK Prime Minister and Conservative Party leader David Cameron bluntly noted that the U.S. administration is friendlier to its enemies than its allies.

It is not clear whether Washington will adapt its tone or approach, as it seems to revel in making threats, stirring the pot, and demanding concessions. Current and former officials who spoke at the gathering hope for a return to normal state-to-state diplomacy to address frictions between and among allies, including defense burden-sharing, trade deals, and critical minerals development. But they recognized that old assumptions have been shattered, and there is no room for complacency. Rasmussen urged NATO countries to raise their defense spending to 4 percent of GDP by 2028, noting that last year Russia spent 7 percent of its GDP on defense, more than all of Europe combined. Such a hike would certainly challenge major allies Britain, France, and Germany, who have struggled to reach the previously agreed 2 percent target. Smaller countries have already stepped up, however: Denmark, Poland, and Estonia currently lead NATO members in contributing over 3 percent of GDP, and the current NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has made 3.5 percent his target for all members to pledge at next month’s NATO summit.

Mette Frederiksen, Denmark’s current two-term prime minister, steered clear of the conference this year, as she is seeking to conduct quiet diplomacy with the Trump administration. However, her defense minister, Troels Lund Poulsen (who also heads the center-right Liberal Party), touted Denmark’s pioneering role in investing directly in Ukraine’s burgeoning defense industry, which helped the country quickly ramp up its arms production from three to forty billion euros. He said it would be difficult, but not impossible, for Denmark to increase its defense spending to 4 percent of GDP.

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The bigger problem for Europe is translating those funds into the wide array of defense capabilities the United States has long supplied, including lift, logistics, precision strike, air defense, and intelligence and surveillance capacity. Former Dutch defense minister Kajsa Ollongren told the gathering that she considers NATO to have already made a commitment offering Ukraine NATO membership, albeit without setting a date, as Kyiv’s leader, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, wants. “Why wouldn’t we want Ukraine in NATO,” she said, “when it has Europe’s strongest and most capable armed forces?” It will not be easy to replace the United States if it steps back from providing twenty thousand forces to bolster European deterrence, but Ollongren urged that planning begin now. New NATO members Finland and Sweden, as well as Türkiye have large active and reserve forces, and the UK and France would likely be called upon to bolster the nuclear deterrence umbrella should the U.S. commitment falter.

The European Union has produced a flurry of responses to fill the gap left by waning and uncertain U.S. commitments. The EU foreign affairs and security chief, Kaja Kallas, delivered a wide-ranging, rousing keynote speech, proclaiming, “We must fight for democracy. We cannot take it for granted…. We have to be active citizens of our democracies.” She announced that the EU was preparing a new package of sanctions on Russia and noted that it has already put forward an eight hundred-billion-euro plan to rearm Europe, which seeks to increase European defense capability. Kallas, the former Estonian prime minister, also reiterated her personal view that Europe should use frozen Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s reconstruction. She said, “I may get in trouble for expressing this view, but as a lawyer, I can make that argument.” An early advocate of pursuing accountability, Kallas also noted that she had just come from the announcement of a war crimes tribunal in Lviv, where evidence of Russian atrocities will be presented. She concluded by underlining the importance of defending free media and fighting disinformation, vowing greater EU support in the face of waning U.S. support.

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Delivering the final keynote speech, former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen emphasized the need for democracies around the world to band together in a “new geopolitical landscape” characterized by “uncertainty and unpredictability.” Tsai said: “The rules of engagement have changed, so our strategies must too.” During her two terms in office, which ended last May, Taiwan increased defense spending by 80 percent, implemented major reforms in hardware and personnel, countered information warfare, and became the world leader in chips powering AI development. All this helped keep China’s ambitions in check, she said. “Taiwan shows democracy can survive.” While the road ahead for democracy will be hard and rocky, the Copenhagen gathering of government and industry leaders, young tech entrepreneurs, and democracy activists provided ample cause for hope.

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