China in Latin America: January 2025
from China Strategy Initiative
from China Strategy Initiative

China in Latin America: January 2025

A cargo ship sails underneath the Bridge of the Americas, which spans the entrance to the Panama Canal in Panama City, Panama, January 22, 2025.
A cargo ship sails underneath the Bridge of the Americas, which spans the entrance to the Panama Canal in Panama City, Panama, January 22, 2025. Aris Martinez/Reuters

This month, Mexico announced plans to curb imports from China across key industries including automobiles, aerospace technology, and textiles. Peru launched investigations into alleged Chinese dumping practices, while Argentina decided to loosen its antidumping measures. Panama started an audit of the Hong Kong-based company that operates two ports in the Panama Canal amid President Donald Trump's repeated claims of Chinese interference in the waterway.

January 30, 2025 10:56 am (EST)

A cargo ship sails underneath the Bridge of the Americas, which spans the entrance to the Panama Canal in Panama City, Panama, January 22, 2025.
A cargo ship sails underneath the Bridge of the Americas, which spans the entrance to the Panama Canal in Panama City, Panama, January 22, 2025. Aris Martinez/Reuters
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Current political and economic issues succinctly explained.

Trade: Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum rolled out Plan Mexico, an agenda for the nation’s economic development over the next six years that seeks to bolster domestic manufacturing. According to the Financial Times, Plan Mexico is an olive branch to President Donald Trump, who has voiced concerns about Mexico serving as a backdoor for Chinese goods entering U.S. markets. The plan will reduce reliance on imports from China, aiming for 50 percent of domestic supply and consumption in strategic sectors to be “Made in Mexico.” 

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Plan Mexico creates incentives to support local industry with a focus that includes automotive, aerospace, pharmaceutical, and textile goods. Mexico aims to increase national content in the global value chains of these key sectors by 15% by 2030. The plan will also support Mexican steel producers, who have complained of being undercut by Chinese imports. 

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Mexico also announced a task force to involve U.S. auto companies in the effort to lessen dependence on Chinese goods. Mexican Economy Minister Marcelo Ebrard emphasized the need for close collaboration to achieve “our main goal, which is reduce the imports from China.”  

In Peru, the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and the Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) launched investigations into China’s alleged dumping practices of hot-rolled carbon steel pipes, stainless steel sinks, and steel wire rod.  

Argentina decided to relax its antidumping measures, setting the maximum duration of dumping investigations at eight months, down from twelve. Antidumping measures will now be limited to a period of three years with one possibility of extension, replacing the previous system that allowed for unlimited renewals. Fifty-two of the ninety-seven antidumping measures currently in place in Argentina target Chinese imports. 

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China suspended purchases of soybeans from five exporters in Brazil, citing concerns over the presence of pesticides and pests. Brazil is the world’s largest soybean exporter, and over 70 percent of its exports go to China. Reuters reported that the timing of the suspension could give China an opportunity to broker a trade deal with the United States. 

Minerals: China announced the discovery of more than twenty million tons of copper on the Tibetan Plateau, which could rival Chile, a global leader in copper production. The plateau’s copper potential could reach up to 150 million tons, according to Chinese researchers. In 2023, China accounted for more than half of global consumption of refined copper. 

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China also discovered lithium reserves that could reach thirty million tons, making it one of the world’s largest holders of lithium—second only to Chile. China is the largest consumer of lithium, an important metal in renewable energy technology. 

Zijin Mining, a Chinese state-owned company, paused its operations at Colombia’s largest gold mine following a homemade bomb attack. The company attributed the attack to illegal miners. According to Colombia’s Mining Association, at least three other attacks have occurred at mines across the country in the past month. 

Diplomacy: Panama continues to push back on Trump’s assertions of Chinese intervention in the Panama Canal. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino reaffirmed that the waterway will remain under Panama’s control. China also doubled down on its assurances that it has never interfered with the management of the Panama Canal. The Panamanian comptroller’s office began an audit of the Hong Kong-based company that operates ports at either end of the waterway. 

On January 13, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Grenadian Prime Minister Dickon Mitchell, the first foreign leader to meet with Xi in Beijing this year. Xi announced his intention to strengthen China’s partnership with Caribbean nations. China and Grenada signed bilateral cooperation documents touching on areas including the economy, renewable energy, tourism, and trade. Chinese Premier Li Qiang affirmed China’s readiness to assist Caribbean nations in climate adaptation and promote the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement. 

China publicized its support for Surinamese Minister of Foreign Affairs Albert Ramdin to lead the Organization of American States (OAS). The next secretary-general of the OAS will be elected in March. 

On January 1, Cuba and Bolivia joined the intergovernmental organization BRICS as second-tier partner countries. 

China criticized Trump’s move to return Cuba to the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Former President Joe Biden removed Cuba from the list shortly before leaving office. 

Fu Hua, president of China’s official news agency Xinhua, met with Cuban Ambassador Alberto Blanco Silva in Beijing on January 16. The pair announced their goal to strengthen cooperation between Xinhua and Cuban media and think tanks. 

Chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee Zhao Leji held talks with President of the Congress of Peru Eduardo Salhuana on January 6, discussing the deepening of bilateral relations. 

The Dominican Republic received a donation of 120 ambulances from China. The ambulances, equipped with incubators, infusion pumps, and ventilators, will help modernize the country’s emergency response system. 

Investments: Testing for metro trains in Bogotá, Colombia, is set to begin in China in February. The megaproject was almost halfway completed by the end of 2024, and trains will begin arriving in Bogotá in September. 

Following the discovery of “slavery-like conditions” at a BYD factory in Brazil in December, the president of BYD Brazil, Tyler Li, said the company will maintain their commitment to start production by the end of 2025. On January 7, BYD and Jinjiang Group, the contractor that hired the workers, met with Brazilian prosecutors, who announced that the workers had received their previously withheld salaries. 

China’s second-largest fund manager, China Asset Management Company, announced plans to launch funds in Brazil this year in an effort to expand its global investor pool. Pending Beijing’s approval, the company will launch a cross-listing exchange-traded fund, which would be the first of its kind in Brazil. China Asset Management Company also revealed its intention to launch funds in the United States. 

Argentina announced the $2 million purchase of three diesel-electric trains from the Chinese state-owned company CRRC International.  

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro shared plans to construct a satellite with China.   

 

 

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At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said that the United States would be expanding its defense partnership with India. His statement was in line with U.S. policy over the last two decades, which, irrespective of the party in power, has sought to cultivate India as a serious defense partner. The U.S.-India defense partnership has come a long way. Beginning in 2001, the United States and India moved from little defense cooperation or coordination to significant gestures that would lay the foundation of the robust defense partnership that exists today—such as India offering access to its facilities after 9/11 to help the United States launch operations in Afghanistan or the 123 Agreement in 2005 that paved the way for civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. In the United States, there is bipartisan agreement that a strong defense partnership with India is vital for its Indo-Pacific strategy and containing China. In India, too, there is broad political support for its strategic partnership with the United States given its immense wariness about its fractious border relationship with China. Consequently, the U.S.-India bilateral relationship has heavily emphasized security, with even trade tilting toward defense goods. Despite the massive changes to the relationship in the last few years, and both countries’ desire to develop ever-closer defense ties, differences between the United States and India remain. A significant part of this has to do with the differing norms that underpin the defense interests of each country. The following Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) memos by defense experts in three countries are part of a larger CFR project assessing India’s approach to the international order in different areas, and illustrate India’s positions on important defense issues—military operationalization, cooperation in space, and export controls—and how they differ with respect to the United States and its allies. Sameer Lalwani (Washington, DC) argues that the two countries differ in their thinking about deterrence, and that this is evident in three categories crucial to defense: capability, geography, and interoperability. When it comes to increasing material capabilities, for example, India prioritizes domestic economic development, including developing indigenous capabilities (i.e., its domestic defense-industrial sector). With regard to geography, for example, the United States and its Western allies think of crises, such as Ukraine, in terms of global domino effects; India, in contrast, thinks regionally, and confines itself to the effects on its neighborhood and borders (and, as the recent crisis with Pakistan shows, India continues to face threats on its border, widening the geographic divergence with the United States). And India’s commitment to strategic autonomy means the two countries remain far apart on the kind of interoperability required by modern military operations. Yet there is also reason for optimism about the relationship as those differences are largely surmountable. Dimitrios Stroikos (London) argues that India’s space policy has shifted from prioritizing socioeconomic development to pursuing both national security and prestige. While it is party to all five UN space treaties that govern outer space and converges with the United States on many issues in the civil, commercial, and military domains of space, India is careful with regard to some norms. It favors, for example, bilateral initiatives over multilateral, and the inclusion of Global South countries in institutions that it believes to be dominated by the West. Konark Bhandari (New Delhi) argues that India’s stance on export controls is evolving. It has signed three of the four major international export control regimes, but it has to consistently contend with the cost of complying, particularly as the United States is increasingly and unilaterally imposing export control measures both inside and outside of those regimes. When it comes to export controls, India prefers trade agreements with select nations, prizes its strategic autonomy (which includes relations with Russia and China through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the BRICS), and prioritizes its domestic development. Furthermore, given President Donald Trump’s focus on bilateral trade, the two countries’ differences will need to be worked out if future tech cooperation is to be realized.